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Abstract 
 
Purpose – Collective Marketing has been given great attention for the past decades and 
now makes a significant contribution to the improvement of smallholders’ welfare. This 
study presents data from a survey of Malawi’s tobacco growers that provide a better 
understanding of factors influencing marketing agent’s performance in the relationship 
between smallholders and their marketing organization. 
Theoretical framework – Principal agent theory was used to guide this study. The model 
for the research and four hypotheses were formulated after intensive review of agency 
theory literature. The study focuses on testing the influence of the factors: monitoring, 
external influence, information exchange and goal conflict on agent’s performance. Data 
from 86 respondents from marketing groups serving smallholder tobacco growers in 
Malawi were collected to provide empirical support to our theoretical predictions. 
Findings – The significant influencing factors on the agent’s performance were found to 
be related to monitoring activities of the agents and information sharing between both 
parties. The research findings support the basic agency theory assumptions that monitoring 
and information exchange positively affect agent’s performance. The findings also suggest 
that the establishment of effective monitoring systems such as inspection of agent’s 
performance reports and sales records is likely to improve the performance of the agent. 
Furthermore, the findings demonstrates that information sharing on issues like quality and 
expected prices of the product may lead to successful achievement of the farmers goals, 
thus, enhances agent’s performance.  
Keywords: Collective marketing, agent’s performance, smallholder farmers, agency theory 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1 Background Information 
 
Recent research in collective action has witnessed an increasing awareness for the need 
and the importance of collective action as a strategy for rural development (McCarthy, 
Dutilly-Diane and Drabo, 2004), especially in developing countries where collective action 
can help smallholders capture economies of scale in production, marketing, transaction 
costs and bargaining power (Di Gregorio, Hagedorn, Kirk, Korf, McCarthy, Meinzen-Dick 
and Swallow, 2004). 
Collective action can be described as an action taken by a group of individuals to achieve 
common interests (Di Gregorio et al. 2004). In this study, collective action is used in terms 
of collective marketing, where smallholders grow their crops individually but market them 
collectively. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO, 2005), collective marketing plays a major role in farming throughout the world. In 
most countries farmers have increased their income and efficiency by joining with other 
farmers to market their goods, purchase their inputs and co-ordinate their farming 
techniques. Collective marketing is an important issue which is given more and more 
attention. Currently, there is growing interest in empirical and theoretical studies of 
agricultural marketing channels (Harrington and Manchester, 1986; Akridge, Whipker, 
Downey and Hooper, 1993; Barkema and Drabenstott, 1995; Royer, 1995). Many authors 
have found that agricultural development will not occur without engaging smallholder 
farmers who represent the majority of actors in this sector and this has placed renewed 
attention on institutions of collective action, such as farmer groups, as an efficient 
mechanism for enhancing marketing performance (Barham and Chitemi, 2009). 
Collective marketing involves farmers’ groups to either market their outputs directly or 
through producer marketing organizations (Arcas and Ruiz, 2003). Such organizations aim 
to defend the interest of their members in order to achieve market power (Schroder, 
Wallace and Mavondo, 1993). The use of those organizations has several implications for 
the groups; both legally and practically. Membership to a club is mandatory in some 
developing countries (Perner, 2008), and membership to an association also brings other 
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benefits to the farmers, such as improved access to information about new farming 
technologies and modern inputs.  
1.2 Brief history of collective marketing in Malawi 
 
In Malawi, an estimated 90 % of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood 
and the vast majority of rural households are farmers who have less than one hectare of 
land to grow crops for food (Seyfarth, 2010). Productivity growth among smallholder 
farmers will lead to agricultural development as they account for a large number of actors 
in the agricultural sector (Magingxa and Kamara, 2003; Diao and Hazell; 2004). However, 
smallholder farmers in Malawi are facing obstacles in market access which if solved will 
lead to more rural employment, food security, sustained agricultural development but also 
increased income to farmers (Poulton, Dorward, Kydd, Poole, Smith, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Dorward, Kydd, Morrison and Urey, 2003). Due to this reason, the government has 
established a policy which focuses on collective action such as collective marketing groups 
as an efficient mechanism for linking smallholders to the market trough a marketing 
association.  
Collective marketing involves different types of crops in Malawi and takes the direction of 
involving smallholders farmers to join groups and market their products collectively 
(Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2006). This study focuses especially on tobacco which 
farmers in groups of ten to thirty members market collectively through the Tobacco 
Association of Malawi (TAMA), a governmental organization which aims to defend the 
interest of farmers. Detailed information regarding TAMA and collective marketing will 
be presented in chapter three. 
1.3 Malawi’s tobacco supply chain 
 
Malawi`s tobacco supply chain involves several tiers starting from the farmers through 
various intermediaries to the manufacturing plants in the US or other countries. First of all, 
farmers deliver tobacco from their farms through clubs to satellite depots suggested by 
TAMA in rural areas, where the tobacco will be kept until Auction Holdings Limited 
(AHL) authorizes depots to deliver the tobacco to the auction floor. After the auction, 
tobacco is delivered to the buyer's processing factories in Malawi, where the raw leaf is 
turned into unprocessed tobacco. Then the tobacco is loaded into shipping containers and 
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shipped to cigarette-manufacturing facilities abroad, mostly those of Philip Morris and 
British American Tobacco. Our work focuses only on the relationship between the 
farmers’ groups and TAMA, marked in red in the figure below. More information 
regarding the supply chain process is presented in chapter 3. 
Figure 1.1 Malawi’s tobacco supply network 
 
1.4 Statement of the problem 
 
Collective marketing of the tobacco crops is seen to be one of the main solutions to several 
problems faced by the smallholder farmers. In Malawi, collective action in agriculture has 
been relatively successful, helping tobacco growers to achieve some economies of scale in 
marketing, reduce transaction costs, achieve some quality requirements, increase crops 
production and reduce the poverty headcount ratio from 50 to 40 percent in only two years, 
1997 and 1998 (World Bank, 2010). But there are still sensitive issues which if solved will 
lead to an improvement of Collective action in Malawi. The study explores the reasons 
why collective action is not a full success in Malawi tobacco industry and how to improve 
those weaknesses. According to the current situation in Malawi, the performance of the 
farmers’ marketing associations is not satisfactory in terms of logistics functions like 
storage, delivery time, information flow, but also other services like credit, input supplies 
and training (Jaffee, 2003; Nsiku and Botha, 2007). Thus, the aim of this study is to 
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analyse clearly the factors or areas that can enable farmers’ groups and their agents to 
improve marketing agent’s performance, thus their market situation. 
1.5 Objective of the study 
 
The primary objective of our paper is to understand collective marketing in Malawi´s 
tobacco sector. The specific objective of this study is to assess how factors like 
monitoring, information exchange, external influence and goal conflict can influence 
marketing agent’s performance in the relationship between farmer’s groups and their 
marketing association, TAMA. From these objectives, we aim to answer the following 
questions: What factors influence marketing agent’s performance in Malawi’s tobacco 
sector? How do factors like monitoring, information exchange, external influence and goal 
conflict influence marketing agent’s performance in Malawi tobacco’s sector? Finding 
such aspects will help to suggest necessary solutions to improve the relationship between 
farmers’ groups and the farmers’ association TAMA and thereby achieve the country’s 
ultimate goal in terms of agricultural success and poverty alleviation. Furthermore, the 
findings of this work can serve as an example for other developing countries which are 
facing the same situation. 
1.6 Relevance of the study 
 
Collective marketing has been given great attention for the past decades since its success 
and sustainability is of crucial importance for smallholder farmers as it improves their 
bargaining power and reduces their marketing costs (Agarwal, 1994; Knox-McCulloch, 
Meizen-Dick and Hazell, 1998; Johnson, Suarez and Lundy, 2002). 
However, few empirical studies have tried to explore the factors influencing marketing 
performance of the producer marketing agents. While the main focus of these empirical 
studies has been on factors influencing the performance of smallholders farmers groups 
(Arcas and Ruiz, 2003; Barham and Chitemi, 2009; Dietz, Aulerich, Irwin and Good, 
2009), our study explores the factors influencing the performance of the marketing agent, 
due to the fact that smallholder farmers can also participate in the marketing system 
collectively through producer marketing agents (Schroder et al. 1993).  
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1.7 Organization of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one introduces collective action in 
marketing and how this concept is important to agricultural marketing and its performance. 
Also in this chapter the statement of the problem and the importance of the study are 
highlighted. Chapter two presents the theoretical review and the framework that will direct 
the study. Collective marketing is discussed in chapter three and chapter four reviews the 
research model presented to support this work as well as the several formulated 
hypotheses. Chapter five is devoted to the research methodology applied by the study 
while chapter six deals with the methods used to validate the measurement of the data. 
Chapter seven presents the data analysis and the testing of the several hypotheses in the 
intention of confirming or disconfirming them. The last chapter, chapter eight presents the 
summary of the study, the limitations of the study and also the suggestions for further 
research. 
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Chapter two: Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical perspective 
 
In this chapter the theoretical framework for the study is reviewed.  Agency theory is used 
to provide theoretical framework for the current study on performance issues with respect 
to collective marketing in Malawi’s tobacco industry sector. Agency theory has two main 
streams: positivist agency theory and principal-agent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Positivist 
agency theory is mostly applied to intraorganisational relationships especially those 
involving corporate managers (Bergen, Dutta and Walker, 1992). It also differs from the 
Agency theory in the fact that it assumes that the agents are risk neutral rather than risk 
averse. Moreover, it does not involve too much mathematical formality in its approach 
(Bergen et al, 1992). In this chapter an overview of principal agency theory is presented 
followed by a presentation of theoretical variables that constitute the principal agent 
paradigm. The presented variables are then used as a foundation for the theoretical 
framework of the current study. 
2.1.1 Agency theory 
 
The origin of Agency theory can be traced from informational economics and is associated 
with the origin of risk sharing issues among the cooperating parties (agents and principals) 
in the 1960’s  (Arrow, 1971; Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency 
theory can be used to assess both an explicit (legal) and implicit (social) aspect of the 
contract between principal and agent. Also it determines the environment under which the 
contractual arrangement between the principal and the agent operates more efficiently. 
The theory is concerned with solving measurement and motivational problems that occur 
when principal and agent differ in their goals and desires and it is infeasible for the 
principal to verify the agent’s performance (Tate, Ellram, Bals, Hartmann and Valk, 2010). 
According to Jensen and Meckling, (1976) agency theory focuses on the relationship 
between a principal delegating some work to an agent who performs that work on his 
behalf. Scholars in the principal-agent school of thought highlight that the delegation of 
authority to make decisions is the core reason why agency problems arise such as 
information asymmetry and goal conflict. Major contributions in this area are Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976), Barney and Ouchi (1988) and Eisenhardt (1989), who described issues 
concerning informational asymmetry, which results into informational problems.  
Principal-agents scholars describe the goal conflicts presumptions which predict 
challenges posed by the conflicting interests between the principal and the agents. On one 
hand, the school further broadens the concept of agency problems to include behaviors like 
laziness, lack of attention to contracted parties, corruption and other behaviors that 
undermine the principal’s welfare. Woodbine (2008) highlighted that the agency problem 
results from moral hazard, associated with the principal’s inability to observe the agents’ 
activities so the agent is tempted to shirk, and from adverse selection, which is resulting 
from agents possessing private information. On the other hand is the risk sharing concept. 
Scholars have highlighted three risk attitudes which are risk neutral, risk averse and risk 
loving which are very important in determining the appropriate contract type. 
It is argued that Agency theory is the dominant theory for analyzing several mechanisms 
which are used to resolve several agency problems resulting from asymmetric information 
(Saam, 2007). Just to mention a few, some of these mechanisms highlighted in the theory 
include monitoring systems, incentives compensations systems, and bonding (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). More details of these mechanisms will be discussed in the next section. 
Agency theory has been widely used in the agricultural literature, too, including studies of 
marketing of agricultural products. Examples of these studies include (Cheung, 1973), 
(Roumasset and Uy, 1987), (Knoerber, 1989), (Allen and Lueck, 1995), (Roumasset, 
1995), (Menard, 1996), (Martinez, 1999), (Bandiera, 2002), (Cook and Barry, 2004) and 
(Boland, Golden and Tsoodle, 2008). In this study of collective marketing we consider 
farmers as the principal and TAMA as the agent. 
2.2 Agency assumptions 
2.2.1 Human assumptions 
 
Underlying the theory are the specific assumption about human nature (self interest, 
bounded rationality, risk aversion), organization (Goal conflict) and information 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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2.2.1.1 Bounded rationality 
 
Bounded rationality is a notion that in decision making, decision makers are constrained 
by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information. The core notion of this 
assumption is that decision makers intend to be rational but this rationality may be 
circumscribed by their limited information processing and communication ability. Due to 
this limitation they seem to have incomplete and inconsistent goals and thus their actions 
may be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions and efforts (Simon, 
1982). Gulbrandsen (1998) highlighted that this limitation is a useful tool in understanding 
the incapability of writing a comprehensive contract that takes into account all the possible 
contingencies. Due to the uncertain environment a business operates in, bounded 
rationality is a problem due to the fact that future circumstances that will have harmful 
effects on the contracting parties cannot be determined from the beginning of the contract 
(ex ante) and cannot be measured easily for performance verification (Rindfleisch and 
Heide ,1997). Generally bounded rationality implies that it is difficult for people to process 
all pieces of information even if they have them. 
2.2.1.2 Self interest 
 
Self interest refers to the fact that in case of unexpected events each actor will behave in 
the best interest of their own functional area (Logan, 2000). Self interest reflects human 
nature as a self centered attitude in which the agent is seeking gains at the expense of the 
principal. Heide and John (1990) connected self interest to free riding behavior in 
marketing research perspective which results in some failures in marketing issues in 
supply chains. In transaction cost economics self interest is regarded as opportunism.  
Parker and Hartley (2003) describe opportunism as the incomplete disclosure of 
information. Willamson (1975, 1985) highlighted that human beings are not only 
boundedly rational but also sometimes behave opportunistically. He explains opportunistic 
behavior as self interest seeking that is exploiting the situation to one’s own benefit. 
 Williamson (1975, 1985) assumes that some people do behave opportunistically and that 
it is very difficult or impossible to determine ex ante who are the honest and dishonest 
people. He assumes that those people who behave opportunistically do not do so always. 
Hence, it is very difficult to fully describe ex ante at what time they do so or do not. This 
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argument is also supported by (Buvik, 1995). Taking into consideration the problem of 
asymmetric information, it is very difficult to determine ex ante when the agent will 
behave opportunistically and when he will not behave so. 
2.2.1.3 Risk sharing 
 
Risk sharing is the problem arising when the principal and the agent have different risk 
attitude. There is a difference between action preferences of principal and agent due the 
different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory describes two contrasting 
risk sharing strategies - risk absorption and risk shifting. When the principal pushes the 
risk to the agent, it is referred to as risk shifting and the principal is considered as risk 
averter. On the other side when the principal bears the whole risk of the transaction it is 
referred to as risk absorption. 
2.2.2 Organizational and informational assumptions 
2.2.2.1 Information asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry has been defined as the situation whereby information is available 
but not evenly distributed between the principal and the agent. Asymmetric information 
gives rise to informational problems which complicate the relationship between two parties 
(Schreuder and Douma, 2008). Information asymmetry gives rise to two informational 
problems, i.e., adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Adverse selection 
Adverse selection is an ex ante information problem which means that one part in the 
transaction is better informed than the other party. It is further explained as the 
misrepresentation of the agent’s ability to perform the contracted task (Arrow, 1985). With 
adverse selection it is difficult for the principal to determine the agent’s ability before the 
contract is written. Principals face problems as agents might hide some pieces of 
information regarding their knowledge and ability to perform the contracted task. 
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Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is an ex post informational problem which refers to the action that occurs 
after the two contracting parties have agreed to execute the transaction. Holmstrom (1979) 
highlighted moral hazard as the situation whereby the agent’s actions cannot be observed 
by the principal, hence the need to be contracted. There are a lot of problems that are 
associated with moral hazard, like free riding, shirking by the agent which in turn reduces 
the principal’s welfare (Holmstrom, 1979). Barney and Ouchi (1988) stated that agency 
problems may exist even in cooperative effort in which no clear cut relationship between 
principal and agent is observed. Generally principals face problems when they cannot 
observe clearly what the agent is performing.  
Eisenhardt (1989) stated that the unobservability of the agent’s actions to the principal 
poses a challenge taking into consideration the presence of self interested human nature. 
He attributed it to two factors, i.e., goal conflict and uncertainty, which are explained 
hereunder. 
2.2.2.2 Goal conflict 
 
Goal conflict is among the agency problems explained under the principal agent 
framework. Goal conflict arises simply because the principal and agent differ in their 
preferences. Each of them wants to maximize individual utility; the agents want to 
maximize their income while the principals focus on maximizing their return (Saam, 
2007).  Generally goal conflict results from incongruent goals between the principal and 
the agent. Most empirical studies have evidenced the tendency for most agents to pursue 
their own goals at the expense of principals (Barney and Ouchi, 1988; Brown and Potoski, 
2003). Several scholars have analyzed several types of goal conflict occurring in different 
scenarios like goal conflicts problems arising in cooperative efforts (Barney and Ouchi, 
1988), between rules and practice (Thompson and Jones, 1986; Braun, 2003) and between 
conflicting policy objectives (Penska and Thai, 2000; Blomerg, 2001). 
Agency theory has contributed to solving agency problems theoretically from the 
principal’s perspective. These theoretical remedies are expected to minimize the agency 
problems described above. Some of the mechanisms highlighted in the principal agent 
framework include reporting procedures, and creating a board of directors. Eisenhardt 
(1989) highlighted that the application of those mechanisms open the agent’s behavior to 
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the principal. Several measures have been proposed by principal agent framework which 
can be used to resolve agency problems, including monitoring. These mechanisms will be 
explained in the next section. 
2.2.2.3 Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty has been described by Willamson (1975) as the inability to predict unforeseen 
contingencies that may occur between the contracted parties. Ellram and Billington (2001) 
stated that contingencies can lead to opportunism whereby one party of the contract can 
take advantage of the situation in order to favorably interpret the contractual terms. 
Uncertainty is linked to the risk issues. According to Bergen et al (1992) uncertainty forces 
principal and agent to take into consideration the resulting risk together with their own risk 
preferences during contracting. Eisenhardt (1989) states that when uncertainty is low the 
costs associated with shifting risk to the agents are low compared to when uncertainty is 
high in the transaction. Uncertainty can be internal or external. 
Internal uncertainty 
Internal uncertainty is the behavioral category of uncertainty under which the organization 
fails to know their actual needs or the prevailing situation surrounding the transaction. This 
makes it difficult for one part of the transaction to verify the fulfillment of the obligation 
by the other party (Ellram and Billington, 2001).  It involves the individuals in the 
transaction. Scholars in principal agent paradigm link behavioral uncertainty with 
information problems, i.e., information asymmetry. Fama and Jensen (1983) highlighted 
that it is difficult  and costly to reveal the agents performance behavior with information 
asymmetry taking into consideration that information is a purchasable commodity. Rokkan 
and Buvik (2003) also linked behavioral uncertainty to the evaluation of the agent’s 
performance problems. Bergen et al. (1992) described that in marketing perspective 
information asymmetry causes the agent sometimes to deliver false information to the 
principal. This can be linked to collective marketing too as the marketing agents can 
sometimes not deliver the true information from the market place. 
External /Environmental uncertainty 
Bergen et al (1992) stated that external uncertainty exists due to the factors that change 
over time, not easy to predict and which are beyond the control of both agent and 
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principal. Regulatory factors, technological change, political factors, climate change, and 
environment factors are among the main factors leading to external uncertainty. External 
uncertainty deals with the level of uncertainty in the market place (Bergen et al, 1992). It 
refers to "unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange" (Noordewier, 
John and Nevin, 1990, p.82). External uncertainty is linked to cost associated with the 
contract adjustments. When uncertainty is combined with human nature (self interest and 
bounded rationality), the contract problems arise resulting into performance evaluation 
challenges (Noordewier et al. 1990). According to Bergen et al (1992) external uncertainty 
leads to incomplete contracts between principals and their marketing agents. 
2.3 Mechanism of Agency theory to solve agency problems 
2.3.1 Mechanism for solving adverse selection problems 
2.3.1.1 Screening 
 
A principal has to formulate an information gathering strategy which will precisely 
determine the true characteristics of the agent’s behavior the principal is looking for. These 
strategies include observing the potential agent through tracking down the reference of the 
agent, personal interviews and assessment centers which also generate costs to the 
principal (Spence, 1974; Bergen et.al, 1992). 
2.3.2 Mechanism for solving moral hazard problems 
2.3.2.1 Monitoring systems 
 
Monitoring systems are used to control the agent’s actions by the principal. The principal 
systematically collects information on what the agent is doing. This can lead the agent to 
act in the principals’ interest if the principal will be able to verify the agent performance 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.323; Eisenhardt, 1989, p.60, 64). Such monitoring 
systems are like budgeting systems, reporting procedures, additional layers of management 
and board of directors. Since these systems generate high costs to the principal, they can be 
complemented by other control systems and incentive compensations systems (Saam, 
2007). According to Bergen et al. (1992) monitoring systems are highly applied in 
marketing to monitor the agent behavior; for example in sales context, field observation by 
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the principal, narrow span of control and periodical review of the sales person are used to 
monitor the agent’s behavior. 
2.3.2.2 Bonding 
 
Under this mechanism the agent binds himself to the principal on certain actions, for 
example delivering information regarding his performance and committing himself to 
receive sanctions in case he violates his commitment. Still this brings costs to the principal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
2.3.3 Mechanism for solving both moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems 
2.3.3.1 Incentive compensation system 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed that incentive or reward systems can be used to 
resolve agent problems. Incentives are more important when monitoring the agent is very 
expensive to the principal and difficult to establish (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Incentive 
systems enable principal and agent to co-align in their preferences because both are 
gaining a return from what they are doing and the rewards for both depend on the same 
actions. Incentive systems implementations bring costs for the principal and risk to the 
agent. For this matter therefore the principal has to take into consideration the tradeoff 
between agency cost and the increase in returns (Saam, 2007). 
2.3.3.2 Self selection 
 
Self section refers to the situation whereby the agents has to select himself from the given 
contract options. For example by choosing either behavioral based contract instead of 
outcome based one, he opens his risk preference to the principal and shows how he is 
ready to work hard for the assignment ahead of him (Arrow, 1986; Saam, 2007). Bergen et 
al (1992) highlighted that the principal has to proactively implement mechanisms that will 
reveal the abilities and willingness of the agents to devote their effort through self 
selection. For example a principal can require a lengthy training program for the agents 
and those agents lacking required competent will self select themselves out of the 
relationship with the principal or not even applying for the position. 
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2.3.3.3 Signaling 
 
Signaling implies that the agent is engaged in activities whose main purpose is to signal to 
the principal that he or she is the type of the agent the principal is seeking (Bergen, et al, 
1992). The agent signals to the principal his risk preferences and willingness to work hard. 
Spence (1974), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Saam (2007) stated that under signaling, 
the agent provides his hidden characteristics to convince the principal about his 
willingness to work hard. In signaling the agent is the one who pays the cost, for example 
paying for higher education in order to acquire more knowledge. 
2.4 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter agency theory has been presented which is the core theory for the current 
study. Historical background of principal agent framework and agency theory assumptions 
has been discussed. In addition to that the mechanisms of solving agency problems have 
been presented. The next chapter presents collective marketing. 
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Chapter three: Collective Marketing in Malawi 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is dedicated to collective marketing for smallholders. Collective marketing is 
of crucial importance for smallholders at this era of high agricultural market competition. 
For them to be able to compete with large corporations, they need to maintain high quality 
and market in large volumes, which can only be achieved through collective marketing. 
The first part of this chapter presents general collective marketing issues, the second part 
narrows down, focusing on collective marketing in Malawi, the country in which the study 
was conducted. 
3.2 General Collective Marketing 
3.2.1 Overview of Collective Marketing for smallholders 
 
Trade liberalization during recent decades has changed the world market in ways that have 
a strong impact on African smallholders. Globalization has left smallholders farmers in a 
vulnerable trade environment due to strong market forces. Smallholders are prevented 
from competing with large corporations in the market due to factors like poor technology, 
weak institutional arrangements and high transaction costs which is mainly caused by 
inefficient established supply chains operated by smallholders’ farmers. Collective 
marketing is seen as one of the main solutions to all these problems faced by smallholders 
if it is properly organized by the respective collective marketing institutions (Nyikahadzoi, 
Siziba, Sagary, Njuki, and Adekunle, 2011).  
Collective marketing has been described as an economic program whereby smallholder 
farmers having shared problems and interests tend to join together into groups so that they 
can be able to pool their produce together and market collectively either as a group or 
through producer organizations. These groups are used by smallholders to acquire 
agricultural inputs collectively as well as coordinating their farming activities (Bikande, 
Ferris, Hodges, Kleih, Okoboi, Robbins and Wandschneider, 2003). Mostly smallholders 
cultivate their produce individually and market them collectively.  
Collective marketing is of crucial importance for smallholders since it improves their 
bargaining power, mitigates exploitation done by middlemen, improves storage facilities 
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 and through external association they are easily linked to the market (Knox-McCulloch et 
al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2002 ). Collective marketing can be in different forms like 
cooperatives, producer groups and associations and inter professional associations which 
deal with specific products. Producer groups and associations are made up of group 
members who seek to resolve common problems (Tungani, 2010). The main focus of this 
study is concerned with producer groups and their associations form of collective 
marketing for smallholders. The overall goal of these forms of collective marketing is the 
same and aims to solve the shared problems of the group members. Therefore, it is 
important to discuss its contribution to smallholders’ economic growth in detail regarding 
its objectives and challenges. 
3.2.2 Objectives of Collective Marketing 
3.2.2.1 Improving economies of scale 
 
Economies of scale have been defined as the situation whereby the cost of producing an 
additional unit of a product is reduced as the proportionate volume of output is increased 
(Waldman and Jensen, 2007). Economies of scale can be realized in different activities like 
manufacturing and marketing.  In marketing economies of scale is realized as the amount 
of the product to be sold is increased leading to the reduction of transaction cost per unit 
and improvement of the selling price. For efficient marketing and realization of economies 
of scale smallholder farmers tend to organize themselves into groups, and market their 
produce either through associations or cooperatives. Schroeder (1992) stated that the main 
motives of agricultural supply and marketing cooperatives are to maximize economies of 
scale to the members. He further highlighted that for these groups to be able to compete in 
the market; efficient operation is needed in their supply chain. 
Generally collective marketing for smallholders is aimed to improve economies of scale 
when they market their produce together. For collective marketing to operate efficiently 
smallholders need to take the responsibility of maintaining quality and also grading their 
produce. If the marketing is done through external association the grading can be done by 
those associations. The most successful strategy of collective marketing is for groups to 
work collectively in an efficient way (Nyikahadzoi et al. 2011). For example, in Malawi 
tobacco collective marketing, grading of the tobacco is done by TAMA, the marketing 
agent. 
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Lowering transportation and transaction cost 
The main objective of collective marketing is to reduce transportation costs for 
smallholders when trying to reach the market for their produce and also improve prices for 
their produce (Shiferaw, Obare and Muricho, 2008).  Bikande, et al. (2003) stated that 
when smallholders collect all their produce together it is easy for them to hire a transport 
for themselves and travel to the market place whereby they can be offered better prices 
than they get from those traders at their local area. This strategy will enable smallholders 
to bypass some of intermediaries acting between them and buyers. This will lead to a 
reduction of traders. The remaining traders will have more business which can lower their 
operation cost resulting in good prices offered to farmers. Hence collective marketing is a 
key tool for smallholders to realize profit when selling their produce. 
Any market exchange involves transaction costs which include costs of gathering and 
processing information about agents, products, markets, negotiation and monitoring cost. It 
is costly for smallholders individually to collect useful market information regarding the 
market and agents. Through collective marketing it becomes easier for them to reduce 
transaction cost (Ton, 2010). 
Strengthen bargaining power 
“Bargaining power refers to the relative capacity to obtain favorable terms from a 
transaction” (Ton, 2010). Bargaining power is associated with the ability to access market 
information, alternative trading, and how long the product can be stored (Ngambeki, 
Nowakunda and Tushemereirwe, 2010). Generally smallholders have a low bargaining 
power especially when they act individually in the market, which makes them sometimes 
sell their product at a cheaper price hence getting a smaller share of added value across 
their supply chain. Ngambeki et al. (2010) stated that collective marketing improves 
bargaining power of the farmers through selling their product collectively rather than 
individually. Collective marketing improves bargaining power on the input side, too, for 
smallholders. This is achieved when they buy their input in bulk together (Ton, 2010). 
Reduce Market Risk 
Market risk is increasing for smallholders due to high rate of competition in the market, 
price instability, high quality products demanded by the buyers, and lack of information 
from further processing industry of their products. Market uncertainty for smallholders can 
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be reduced through participation in a collective marketing institution with well established 
market information flows, and transparent communication lines. 
Increasing quality control 
Collective marketing enables farmers to produce exclusive and distinctive products which 
generates high price (Bikande, et al., 2003). This is achieved when they collect their 
produce together, sort and grade according to the quality. Grading can also be done by the 
association linking them to the market. Through this collaboration it is easy for them to 
maintain certain standard of quality which will attract major buyers to pay high prices for 
their produce. As a group they would like to maintain this reputation by focusing on 
quality improvement. This argument is also supported by Bikande, et al.  (2003). A good 
example of quality issues can be seen from Malawi Tobacco growers whereby TAMA as 
their marketing agents grades their tobacco before it reaches to the auction floor; as a result 
it motivates farmers to focus on quality issues because the high quality tobacco is sold at a 
better price. 
Incentive to increase production 
Collective marketing encourages farmers to shift from subsistence production to 
commercial production. This is mostly achieved because they are able to purchase input in 
bulk, access extension services and agricultural research services (Ngambeki, et al., 2010). 
Also collective marketing makes marketing easier for smallholders hence giving them a 
stronger incentive of using more of their land to produce more surplus which leads to 
income increase.  
Improving access to credit 
Banks and other formal financial organizations require collateral for them to offer loans. It 
is difficult for smallholder farmers to have enough collateral individually. Through 
collective marketing smallholders engage in group lending which is used as collateral to 
borrow money from financial institutions. Also it is easier for an external organization or 
association to link them to credit institutions when they are in groups rather than act 
individually. Collective marketing is a bridge between credit institutions and farmers 
groups (Bikande et al., 2003; Ngambeki et al., 2010 ). A good example can be seen from 
Malawi collective marketing groups which have been able to be linked to different sources 
of credit. The data was collected from twenty tobacco groups in 2010 by ICRISAT in 
collaboration with Molde University College. They are able to receive credit in cash and in 
kind as presented in the figures below. 
credit, using the future crop as collateral. We see th
this environment. Source: ICRISAT 2010 data from Malawi tobacco groups
Figure 3.1 Sources and types of credit
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groups as principals monitor their agents who perform marketing activities on their 
behalves resulting into principal agent relationship. Monitoring systems are used to control 
the agent’s performance by the principal. The principal systematically collects the 
information on what the agent is doing. This can spur the agent to act in the principals’ 
interest if the principal is able to verify the agent’s behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 
p.323; Eisenhardt, 1989 p.60, 64). 
3.2.3.2 Information sharing 
 
Information sharing is one of the key strategies for viability of collective marketing. It 
constitutes establishment of open communication lines between members and good 
practices of information exchange (Subba et al, 2008). Ostrom (1990) described lack of 
information as a social dilemma obstacle which must be solved for existence or success of 
collective marketing institutions. Collective marketing groups or associations have to be 
transparent regarding the transactions of the group and also have a good line of market 
information, like prices and product quality to members. Information is a key to any 
transaction taking place between two exchanging parties (Ostrom, 1990). This is very 
essential to avoid information asymmetry problem especially when a principal-agent 
relationship exists like the case of Malawi tobacco growers where sales and marketing 
activities are performed by their agent TAMA. Catacutan, Bertomeu, Arbes, Duque and 
Butra (2006) stated that effective feedback and communication is of critical importance for 
maintenance or enhancement of collective marketing.  
3.2.3.3 Bounded goals 
 
Swallow, Garrity and Noordwijk (2001) highlighted that conflicts within collective 
marketing groups is unavoidable due to unequal distribution of income and 
responsibilities. Across the supply chain some members or agents will obviously act 
opportunistically, that is, favoring their own interest. Ostrom (1990) found that clearly 
defined goals enable collective marketing groups to clearly govern their behavior. This 
implies that clearly defined goals are a key for successful collective marketing. Each group 
or institution has to clearly define the boundaries of its responsibilities and the way of 
income and benefit distribution among members.  
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3.2.3.4 Clear set of rules and obligations 
 
Clearly defined rules and obligations are key determinants for a successful collective 
marketing (Ostrom, 1990). Clearly defined rules are easily monitored and they reduce 
governance and coordination costs for the respective collective marketing group. For easy 
compliance those rules need to be established by the group members so they will match 
with their local needs and enhance effectiveness and viability of collective marketing 
activities (Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Modifications process of these rules 
should involve each individual affected by them. External authorities like governments and 
other agents should support and respect these rules (Ostrom, 1990).  
3.2.3.5 Institutional structure and governance 
 
According to Ostrom (1990), sustainability of collective marketing is highly dependent on 
institutional structure and with well established governance system. Clearly defined rules 
and responsibilities of each member of the institution simplify the operation of the group. 
Simple and understandable rules enhance compliance and accountability and it acts as a 
self enforcing mechanism (Ostrom, 1990). A well organized collective marketing 
institution results in a highly coordinated and cohesive group. 
3.2.3.6 Incentives 
 
Successful and sustainable collective marketing needs proper establishment of incentives 
(Calzorali, 2001). These incentives range from within the group and also between the 
group and agents, governments or any other organization supporting the group. Marketing 
agents, governments and other associations need to provide training and other services like 
extension services, credit services, improve infrastructure, and provide relevant market 
information. These services act as incentives for smallholders to participate in collective 
marketing (Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Furthermore if there is principal agent 
relationship, smallholders need to provide incentives to their agents. Since agents have 
private information regarding the market, principals need to design an incentive scheme or 
contract that will motivate or attract agents to behave in accordance with the principals’ 
interests (Calzorali, 2001). This implies that collective marketing groups marketing their 
produce through their agents need to establish a good incentive scheme which will 
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motivate these associations to serve them according to their needs. Example of such 
incentives could be payment of subscription fees, producing quality products and receiving 
a percentage of farmer’s earnings.  
3.3 Collective Marketing of tobacco in Malawi 
 
Malawi is a largely agricultural country where several types of tobacco are cultivated. The 
main types are burley and flue cured. Tobacco is so important to economic progress in 
Malawi; it has been called Malawi’s “Green gold”. It contributes approximately 70% of 
the country’s export earnings (Government of Malawi Economic Reports, 2008) and it will 
be our focus in this study. Malawi has recently overtaken the US as the world’s leading 
exporter of burley tobacco (Jaffee, 2003), and produces about 20 % of the world’s total 
production of burley tobacco (Mackay and Eriksen, 2002). Tobacco determines the pace 
and direction of overall economic growth for Malawi since there is a close correlation 
between agricultural sector performance and overall economic performance.  
In Malawi, an estimated 90 % of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihoods 
and the vast majority of rural households are farmers who have less than one hectare of 
land to grow crops for food (Seyfarth, 2010). Productivity growth among smallholder 
farmers will lead to agricultural development as they account for a majority of actors in the 
agricultural sector (Magingxa and Kamara, 2003; Diao and Hazell; 2004). However, 
smallholders farmers in Malawi are facing obstacles in market access which if solved will 
lead to more rural employment, food security, sustained agricultural development and also 
income to farmers (Poulton et al., 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Dorward et al., 2003). The 
improvement of market access is of critical importance. That is why it has lead policy 
makers to focus on collective action such as farmers groups as an efficient mechanism for 
enhancing collective marketing performance (Kariuki and Place, 2005).  
Collective marketing involves different types of crops in Malawi and takes the direction of 
encouraging smallholder farmers to join groups and market their products collectively 
(Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Collective action is well recognized as being an 
important component of rural development (McCarthy; Dutilly-Diane; Drabo, 2004), but 
this is not going to happen without the involvement of the government. Most of collective 
marketing issues in Malawi have been strongly supported by the government since 1990.  
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3.3.1 Legal and regulatory context 
 
Before 1989, tobacco production was highly controlled by the government. All tobacco 
producers were required to obtain a license from the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) 
- the government regulatory body - and only estates and landowners were eligible to apply 
for production license. In the late 1980s, Malawi adopted a policy of liberalization in line 
with demands from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Millington, 2008). Reforms under the adjustment program included allowing smallholder 
farmers who dominate 90% of the agricultural sector to produce cash crops, and liberalize 
marketing of agricultural outputs and inputs. An important issue of these reforms was the 
creation of burley tobacco groups in the mid 1990s with the support of the Ministry of 
Agriculture of Malawi. The government initiated the issue of collective marketing and 
value adding in order to position itself better in the world market by encouraging farmers 
to join groups comprising ten to thirty people and market their product collectively. These 
groups were a success since they made possible for the farmers to achieve economies of 
scale in marketing, and improve farming productivity through collective action (Negri and 
Porto, 2007). These measures contributed greatly to the rapid expansion in tobacco 
production since 1995.  
Post liberalization era brought the introduction of a program to license intermediate buyers 
(IB) of tobacco by the government. These intermediate buyers were a source of immediate 
cash for smallholder tobacco growers since they were middlemen between smallholder 
tobacco growers and the auction floor, buying raw tobacco leaves from several small 
growers at a negotiated price and selling them on the auction floor at the market price 
(Nsiku and Botha, 2007). This has led to an increase of the competition in the tobacco 
marketing sector.  However, the IBs program proved to be controversial since this practice 
tended to reduce the revenues going to farmers (Jaffee 2003). Therefore, the Malawian 
government in its view of supporting the smallholders abolished the intermediate buyers 
system and began setting minimum prices for the various grades of tobacco in 2007, after 
accusing merchants of putting growers out of business by offering them too low prices 
(Otañez, Mamudu and Glantz, 2007).  
Another institutional development made possible by a credit under a World Bank Project 
was to offer smallholders access to credit (Jaffee, 2003). This service was initially possible 
through the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), a government owned company 
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designed to provide financial services for smallholder tobacco growers organized in 
groups.  
The Malawian government sets several policies in order to improve the well-being of 
Malawians by promoting broad-based and rapid agricultural development. Among them, 
the Cotonou trade agreement that governs the raw tobacco trade relations between Malawi 
and Europe and the AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) that governs the raw 
tobacco trade relations between the country and the USA (Otañez et al, 2007).  
3.3.2 Stakeholders of Collective Marketing 
 
The tobacco industry in Malawi involves several actors that somehow influence it. Below 
are the major players: 
3.3.2.1 Grower 
 
Growers are the pillar of the whole tobacco industry since they are responsible for the 
production. Malawi's tobacco growers are scattered across the country and are largely 
grouped into two types: Estates and growers associations. Estates are large farms that will 
comprise tenants while growers associations on the other hand are several individuals 
coming together to market tobacco as a group. Any of them who seek to be a commercial 
tobacco grower must be registered at the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) who issues 
the grower with a grower registration number and a production certificate. Without a 
registration number, no person can sell tobacco in the floors. 
3.3.2.2 Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) 
 
To facilitate collective action of smallholder farmers in terms of collective marketing the 
government of Malawi operates through TAMA. This organization was established by the 
government to serve and defend the interests of farmers in all marketing promotion 
operations. Its objectives are to advance and protect the interests of all tobacco growers, 
provide compelling services to its members and generate wealth through wider income 
diversification and value and develop the tobacco industry in Malawi. This association 
offers several services to farmers’ groups but also to estates, cooperatives, and corporate 
growers. These services include registration of farmers to TCC, ensuring market and 
information access to farmers, providing inputs and training necessary to the production of 
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tobacco, ensuring safety and quality in transportation of its members’ products, 
representing its growers on the auction floors through its tobacco sales representatives, 
bargain on behalf of its growers on the contract sales and act in case of rehandling 
problems faced by farmers. Membership to TAMA was mandatory before 2004, but as the 
tobacco industry sector evolved, membership to TAMA became voluntary after that 
period. Source: www.tamalawi.com 
3.3.2.3 Auction Holding Limited (AHL) 
 
Auction Holdings Limited (AHL) is the sole auctioning company, established in 1939, 
which provides a platform for tobacco trading in Malawi. In 1981, AHL acquired the 
majority shareholding in Central Tobacco Properties Limited and the group now comprises 
Auction Holdings Limited, Agricultural Trading Company, Tobacco Investments Limited 
and Malawi Leaf. The core mission of the group is to play a leading role in improving and 
managing the best systems for handling and marketing tobacco and related products and 
services but also to provide value to shareholders and other stakeholders. AHL operates 
four main floors for tobacco selling and runs also rural markets where AHL provides 
facilities and support structures that enable smooth trading of tobacco. Source: 
www.ahlmw.com 
3.3.2.4 Tobacco Control Commission 
 
The Tobacco Control Commission is a government owned regulatory authority established 
in 1938 under the Control of Tobacco Auction Floors Act Chapter 65:03. Its main mission 
is to manage and regulate the systems of production and marketing of tobacco in the 
country and to promote the growth of the industry while ensuring good environmental, 
socio-economic and health issues of production and consumption. The organization 
controls and regulates the sale of tobacco as well as the license registrations of growers 
and sellers. TCC reviews the applications and investigates on businesses that apply for 
tobacco licenses (Jaffee, 2003). This organization also advises the government on sale and 
export of tobacco and holds public hearings on violations of the Tobacco Control 
Ordinance. Source: www.tccmw.com 
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3.3.2.5 Buyers 
 
Malawian tobacco attracts several buyers. Limbe Leaf Tobacco Co., a unit of Universal 
Crop, Alliance One Inc. consisting of Dimon and StanCom, Africa Leaf Malawi Ltd., 
Premium Tama Tobacco Ltd., Malawi Leaf Co., RWJ Wallace Ltd. and Japan Tobacco 
Inc. are the biggest buyers of tobacco in Malawi which export the leaves to other countries. 
Among them, the major are Limbe Leaf and Alliance One that buy together nearly 90 per 
cent of the market, the remaining is spread among the others (Jaffee and Nucirofa, 2005). 
These buyers operate as a cartel through their monopoly on processing, and have 
maintained their share over time with only minor variations (World Bank, 2005).  
3.3.3 Collective Marketing process 
 
Before 2003, the main marketing channel for tobacco in Malawi was the auction floors, the 
place where the buyers declare interest of the crop by bidding. A change in the marketing 
system started in 2003 with the use of contract growing especially for the Flue Cured 
tobacco.  
In 2006, the use of contract marketing system was introduced on a three years pilot study. 
This type of contract involves buyer and seller to agree on prices allowing negotiation 
between them. The Ministry of agriculture and food security of Malawi has each year 
given is approbation for the continuation of this system. However, the decision to sell 
either on auction or through contract remains the choice of each farmer after considering 
the advantages and disadvantages of each system. Therefore, it appears that still the 
traditional marketing channel for tobacco in Malawi is the old auction system and this is 
not to displease the stakeholders (Jaffee, 2003). Intermediate buyers still also exist but are 
considered as an illegal system (Jaffee and Nucirofa, 2005). 
In Malawi, the process of collective marketing starts with the farmers themselves whereby 
they cultivate their tobacco individually with the assistance and training from their agents 
and the government extension workers. After harvesting their produce, they dry the leaves, 
and then pack them in bales. Each farmer’s bales are tagged with names and transported to 
TAMA warehouses. From the warehouses, TAMA transports the tobacco and delivers it at 
the auction floor on the day allowed by AHL. TAMA is responsible for negotiating 
transport cost of the trucks picking tobacco to the auction floor on behalf of the 
smallholders, also storage of tobacco bales before delivering it to the auction floor, and 
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helping and protecting smallholders during the sale of the tobacco at auction floor. In the 
past, farmers have been complaining a lot about the mismanagement of these depots due to 
bales gone missing or damaged or due to high transportation costs for the deliveries made 
to the auction markets (Jaffee, 2003). Even if some improvements have been reported 
regarding these arrangements, inefficiencies still remain for services provided (Jaffee, 
2003). TAMA negotiates on behalf of the smallholders especially when the price offered 
by the buyers is not satisfactory. After the sale of tobacco the farmer receives the money 
through their bank accounts several weeks after in general and after several taxes and 
levies including subscription fees for TAMA membership and government taxes have been 
deducted (Takane, 2006).  
The cigarette manufacturers at the international level establish prearranged contracts with 
the local companies to purchase tobacco in Malawi; however they do not have ownership 
interests in those companies (Otañez et al, 2007). British American Tobacco and Philip 
Morris are the key buyers of tobacco from companies in Malawi and influence Malawi’s 
tobacco sector (Carrao, Guindon, Sharma and Shokoohi, 2000). 
3.3.4 Collective Marketing control mechanisms 
 
According to Egelhoff (1984), control is an integrating mechanism within an organization 
to reduce uncertainty and ensure that behaviors from all parts of the organization are 
compatible and support common goals. In the same vein, Youssef (1975) defined control 
as a set of activities to ensure the execution of goals and plans. Furthermore, Egelhoff 
(1984), associates control with reactive measurement and feedback processes in order to 
evaluate the performance. Based on these authors, the word “control” implies everything 
that can ensure that the actors at all levels of the organization work to ensure the 
realization of agreed goals.  
The objective of control mechanisms in collective marketing is to ensure that the collective 
marketing-related activities and decisions are made effectively to achieve the collective 
marketing objectives (Subba et al. 2008). From their point of view, a regular monitoring, 
review and quality control are the important conditions for successful collective marketing 
activities. 
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In Malawi, each organization (e.g. TAMA, AHL, TCC) has their own control mechanisms 
in terms of annual audit but the entire chain is not concerned with any control mechanisms 
and this raises a problem in assessing the actual performance of the actors. 
3.3.5 Collective Marketing challenges 
 
The benefits of collective marketing have been discussed several times in this study. 
However it would be difficult to achieve those benefits and keep improving if the 
challenges are not pointed out and addressed accordingly (Subba et al. 2008). The main 
challenges that face collective marketing in Malawi are presented below: 
3.3.5.1 Logistic performance of the marketing services providers 
 
According to Ton (2010), smallholder farmers that bulk their products through state 
marketing boards are highly likely to face challenges in terms of the efficiency in services 
delivered by the organization. And this is one of the most important challenges since it is 
the peacemaker of the relationship between principals and agents (Ton, 2010). In Malawi, 
TAMA, the major service provider in terms of tobacco is accused by the farmers of not 
fulfilling its obligations in light of its promises. And this is also acknowledged by one of 
TAMA’s officers in an interview with one of the authors on the 27th of January at TAMA 
headquarters in Malawi and we cite “… we acknowledge that we have been sleeping for 
the past two years”. 
Furthermore, Nsiku and Botha (2007) recognized that the challenge of the tobacco industry 
in Malawi includes certainly the small-scale nature of production but mostly, the poor 
performance of the state and public institutions that provide inadequate market information 
and unequal benefit-sharing for tobacco revenues between producers and buyers. 
3.3.5.2 Asymmetric information and threat of opportunistic behavior 
 
Fama (1980) says that agency relationships consist of contracts under which principals 
engage agents to perform some activities on their behalf and this involves a delegation of 
some decision-making authority to the agents. And according to Eisenhardt (1989) 
information is asymmetrically distributed among principals and agents, especially the 
information detained by the agents about their own behaviors or decision making in the 
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operations. This creates a situation where information is not easily available to the 
principals and opens a room for opportunistic behavior from the agents.  
Furthermore, collective marketing involves delegation of decision making. Farmers’ 
groups by giving power to their organization to sell their crop, delegate all decisions 
making regarding the marketing system used. Farmers want their products to be sold at a 
good price and need to have some assurance that their agent will do it well while the agent 
wants the member to provide good quality products. In these situations, a workable 
‘middle-way’ has to be found to make the deal acceptable both for the member and for the 
organization. 
Agency theory assumes that human beings are inherently risk-averse and self-interested 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Mostly agents and principals have divergent preferences for outcomes 
and these divergences make agents to minimize their own risks in their decisions, at the 
expense of increasing the risk from the Principal's side. Self interested parties lead also to 
opportunistic behavior from them. The diagram below adapted from Ton (2010) has been 
modified to suit our analysis. It represents the marketing challenges which lead to 
opportunistic behavior. 
Figure 3.2 Risk opportunistic behavior challenge.  
 
 
 
3.3.5.3 Reluctance to join farmers’ groups 
 
Despite the several advantages of collective marketing, it is a fact that, in Malawi, some 
farmers prefer to remain alone for growing and marketing their tobacco. There are several 
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reasons for that choice and the main ones are concerned with low and late payments and 
fraud and corruption among members as presented by the figure below.  
Figure 3.3 Disadvantages to join groups. Source: ICRISAT data 2010 
 
 
3.3.5.4 Lack of monitoring systems 
As said earlier there are no clear collective marketing control systems or monitoring 
systems so far in Malawi (Otañez et al, 2007). And this is a real handicap for the 
achievement of high performance of the industry (Egelhoff, 1984). Subba et al. (2008) 
assert that there is a need to evolve a crystal clear mechanism to regulate the activities 
when more than one organization come together to achieve stated objectives. 
3.3.5.5 Price, attributable costs after sale and quality issue  
Tobacco prices are largely influenced by buyers (Jaffee, 2003) and this is due to the 
market structure itself. In Malawi, most of tobacco leaf is generally sold through the 
auction floors in which the government used to hold a slight majority of the shares (Nsiku 
and Botha, 2007). Sales through the auction floors are the object of several charges and 
taxes including a commission of 3.95% of the gross revenue realized imposed by AHL on 
sales and fees and payments regarding input credit and tobacco association fee (Jaffee, 
2003). In addition to that, from the gross revenue of Malawi growers, AHL deduct 1% for 
tobacco research contributions for the Agricultural Research and Extension Trust (ARET), 
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a non-profit organization funded and controlled by TAMA. Also 0.5% is deducted for 
TAMA’s classification and a 0.13% deduction is made for the TCC. Finally a 0.92 US $ is 
charged per bale of tobacco. All these levies account for some 3.58% of the gross revenue 
in addition to the 3.95% retains by AHL and this is very high by international standards. 
Another issue strongly related to international buyers is the quality classification system 
that they have for the Malawian tobacco (Jaffee, 2003).  There are differences between the 
way farmers and buyers classify the tobacco and this often leads to disagreement at the 
point of sale concerning what constitutes top-grade tobacco (Nsiku and Botha, 2007) and 
this makes farmers fail to obtain price offers related to the real quality requirements of 
their tobacco (Kadzandira, Phiri, and Zakeyo, 2004). While this situation indirectly 
encourages low-grade tobacco, no clear incentives come to support top-grade production 
(Nsiku and Botha, 2007). Without receiving the expected prices for their product, farmers 
do not see any interest in improving the quality of their tobacco. This may explain a 
quality reduction of Malawi’s tobacco since the late 90s (Jaffee, 2003). According to 
Jaffee (2003), there are a number of factors in addition to pricing issues that bring 
plausibility to the notion of quality reduction of Malawian tobacco. These include: 
- The entry and subsequent exit of intermediate buyers has led with time to a confusion 
regarding tobacco grade from the farmers. Most of these middle-men lacked prior tobacco 
experience and/or suitable facilities to grade and bale the purchased crop.  
- Logistical problems regarding the smallholder tobacco storage and delivery to the 
auctions and other problems of ‘congestion’ associated with deliveries to the Lilongwe 
auction. It is well known that tobacco quality is affected by several factors including 
storage (Jaffee, 2003). The more the crop waits before reaching the auction floor the more 
it is likely to lose its value due to bad storage conditions. 
- The weak incentives for farmers to produce a high quality crop due to low prices paid on 
auctions during the mid-to-late 90s for top-grade tobacco compared with the average or 
below average quality of tobacco. 
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3.3.5.6 Low bargaining power 
Bargaining power refers to the relative capacity to obtain favourable terms from a 
transaction and is strongly related to access to information, alternative trading options, 
dependencies, and to the perishability of the product (Bijman, Ton and Meijerink, 2007).  
According to (Nsiku and Botha, 2007), prices should be determined at the auction through 
interactions between buyers and sellers, but the divergences and the farmers’ complaints 
after the sale suggest that farmers are not getting the information they require to earn fair 
revenues (Nsiku and Botha, 2007) and this brings again the problem of asymmetric 
information. It appears clearly that farmer groups have low bargaining power when it 
comes to their products and this is due to the fact that they have usually urgent need for 
cash to pay back loans and avert inflationary effects. This puts the buyers in a stronger 
market position than the sellers (Nsiku and Botha, 2007). According to Bijman, Ton and 
Meijerink (2007), smallholders have particularly low bargaining power when they deal 
with a crop that needs further processing.  
In Malawi, the tobacco buyers have been described as an ‘oligopsony’ (World Bank, 2005; 
Otañez et al, 2007) where each of the few buyers exerts a disproportionate influence on the 
market. And even if TAMA is in the market to represent smallholders, it has limited 
influence on the auction price (Kadzandira et al., 2004). The low bargaining power of 
smallholders may lead them to under-value their products and obtain a smaller share of the 
added value created in the supply chain (Bijman et al. 2007). 
3.3.5.7 Smuggling and fraud 
The combination of several levies, high taxes and auction fees but also high transaction 
costs within the tobacco supply chain in Malawi, has led many growers to by-pass the 
established marketing channel and try to sell their tobacco directly to international buyers 
in several locations across the borders to Zambia and Mozambique (Jaffee, 2003). It has 
been reported that 15 per cent of the tobacco on the Zambian market is smuggled from 
Malawi since it can be worth more money on auction floors there than in Malawi (Nsiku 
and Botha, 2007). And this is due to different trading systems in those countries. 
Smallholders are reported to get a better deal as they do not pay the associated costs of the 
auction system and achieve considerable savings in logistics and transaction costs (Nsiku 
and Botha, 2007). The tobacco auction floor system in Malawi is clearly undermined by 
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the growing problem of tobacco smuggling and this should be a warning for the industry 
(Jaffee, 2003). 
Recently, farmers have been required to pay a 7% withholding tax on the revenues 
obtained through their auction sales and this withholding tax on gross proceeds constitutes 
essentially an installment payment for income tax (Jaffee, 2003; Nsiku and Botha, 2007). 
People earning more than 30.000 MK (Malawian Kwacha) are subject to income tax 
(Jaffee, 2003), and smallholder groups were exempt from this tax due to their constitution. 
However, this arrangement has been abused by estate owners who registered themselves as 
‘clubs’ and giving a fictitious list of members which lead to a disarray in the grower 
registration system (Jaffee, 2003).  
For sure, the Malawi tobacco subsector is at a crossroads, facing major problems that 
threaten its sustainability and which pose a number of serious policy questions. It seems 
that the best days of the tobacco industry in Malawi are behind and all actors of the supply 
chain have been subjected to accusations about how their actions or inactions have 
weakened the industry (Negri and Porto 2007).  
3.4 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter was dedicated to present collective marketing and its attributes in general as 
well as the way it is applied to the Malawian environment. The following chapter will 
present the research model and the hypotheses. 
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Chapter four: Research model and hypotheses 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research model and hypotheses for the current 
study. These hypotheses have been formulated from the model which has been developed 
from literature review of principal agent theoretical assumptions which was presented in 
chapter two and discussion of collective marketing in the previous chapter. While many 
factors influence marketing agent’s performance, this study aims at testing a few of them 
as presented in the model below.  
4.2 Research Model 
 
This study aims at testing the influence of the developed independent variables on the 
dependent variable, focusing on how these independent variables can influence the 
performance behavior of the agent. The dependent variable is agent’s performance (PERF) 
which is influenced by the developed independent variables. These independent variables 
are Monitoring (MONIT), External influence (EXTI), Goal conflict (GOAL) and 
Information (INFO). An increase in monitoring and information is expected to have a 
positive influence on agent’s performance because it improves performance, while an 
increase of goal conflict and external influence is expected to have a negative influence on 
agent’s performance because their increase impairs performance of the respective agents.  
 
Figure 4.1 Research model 
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4.3 Research hypotheses 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Agent’s performance 
Performance is a recurrent theme which has been given great attention within the 
marketing and management discipline and it is of interest of both scholars and managers 
(Feder, 1965; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003). 
Performance has been used in most empirical studies to examine a variety of strategic and 
process issues in organizations (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Ginsberg and Venkatraman, 
1985). The concept of performance can be assessed using either financial indicators based 
on objective data, operational indicators based on perceptual data or both. Financial 
indicators of performance include profit growth, cash flows and ROI but the availability of 
these data is difficult due to confidentiality reasons. On the other side, operational 
performance indicators include customer satisfaction, marketing effectiveness, services or 
product quality, services value added, training and technological efficiency. Operational 
data or perceptual data from primary sources are not easily influenced by confidentiality 
issues, sensitivity and other social issues (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Objective 
performance data is preferable to perceptual performance data, due to its unbiasedness.  
However, previous research suggests that perceptual measures of performance can 
accurately reflect objective measures, thus enhancing validity and reliability (Dess and 
Robinson, 1984).  
From the previous chapters, this study focuses on the agent’s performance based on 
operational performance indicators as discussed above. Agent’s performance is the 
dependent variable for this study and it can be influenced by several factors. Based on the 
agency literature monitoring and information can increase the performance of the 
respective agent while goal conflict and external influence can impair an agent’s 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wright, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; McQuiston, 
1989). Since these factors are controllable, their effect on performance should be 
recognized and understood. Manipulation of these factors can lead to performance 
improvement. The discussion of each of these factors is presented below. 
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Independant variables 
 
Monitoring 
Agency theory has been widely used in studies to understand how various control 
mechanisms can be implemented to enhance performance (Welbourne, 1995). Rokkan and 
Buvik (2003), presents cases related to the absence of proper monitoring systems and 
highlights that such situations lead to performance evaluation problems and behavioral 
uncertainty but also to free riding problems from the agent’s side. Furthermore, 
Holmstrom (1982) claimed that free riding results from moral hazard since there is lack of 
observation of the agent’s individual actions by the principal due to asymmetric 
information. Many scholars have discussed the problems arising from moral hazard and 
have suggested that the remedy to this problem is for the principal to devote efforts to 
monitoring the agent’s actions (Holmstrom, 1982; Whynes, 1993). In the same vein, 
Rokkan and Buvik (2003) and Eisenhardt (1985) have highlighted the usefulness of 
monitoring activities in reducing opportunistic behavior and increasing an agent’s 
performance. However, some authors suggest that peer monitoring might result in lower 
levels of individual performance and too risk averse employees (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 
1994; Welbourne, 1995).  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Eisenhardt (1989), monitoring systems 
serve to control the agent and the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the 
principal if the principal systematically can observe the agent’s behavior. In this study, 
monitoring reflects the principal’s (farmers groups) ability to observe their tobacco 
marketing agent’s (TAMA) practices and behaviors in marketing activities and related 
services. Rokkan and Buvik (2003) found the use of tight monitoring to be an effective 
way to raise performance among supply chain members. From this perception we propose 
the following:  
H1: There is a positive association between monitoring of implemented activities and 
agent’s performance. 
 
External Influence 
In the literature about marketing cooperatives, factors influencing the marketing 
performance of agents have been the interest of many scholars (Lele, 1981; Markelova and 
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Meinzen-Dick, 2009). These factors can be internal or external to the marketing 
association. McQuiston (1989) described external influence as the extent to which the 
communication offered by individual for consideration is considered to affect the actions 
of other participants. This concept can be extended to include decisions or actions of other 
interested parties to the decision taken by the organization. Experience from resource 
management and marketing shows that collective marketing requires a specific enabling 
external environment, which includes the relationships between farmer groups and the 
state, market, and civil society (Markelova and Meinzen-Dick, 2009).  
According to Chen et al. (2006), the impact of external influence on farmers groups or 
cooperatives can be either positive or negative. The government and other powerful 
authorities can positively influence collective marketing, thus the agent’s performance by 
enabling a legal, political and policy environment but also by establishing supportive 
community power structures which does not subvert the internal democratic procedures 
and the objectives of the organization (i.e. TAMA). On the other hand, many marketing 
cooperatives face external influence problems from the political elite who are more 
powerful and able to control their decision (Lele, 1981). These problems arise due to poor 
management of the particular marketing association and have a negative impact on their 
performance. She further stated that the performance of these marketing association tends 
to be influenced by a broad range of interests from other interested parties which in general 
view affect its performance negatively. In this study external influence is characterized by 
the government or other powerful individuals’ actions to interfere in the decisions related 
to the dyad principals and agents.  From the discussion above we can hypothesize as 
follows: 
H2: There is a negative association between external influence and agent’s performance. 
 
Information 
Information has been defined as “data that has been organized or given structure - that is, 
placed in context - and thus endowed with meaning” (Glazer 1991). Information is a vital 
tool for any kind of task to operate effectively. Information is viewed as a transferable 
commodity which can be exchanged between two parties. Well established 
communication lines leads to explicit commitment and moral persuasion for any 
relationship (Chou; Chen and Pu, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989) and also strengthens the 
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relationship between principal and agent (Glazer, 1991).This implies that the more easily 
information flows between the two parties, the more the relationship is strengthened and 
leads to the successful achievement of the goals. Through information sharing, principal 
and agent build supportive working environment which can help in the improvement of 
several activities performed by either part.  
From the literature, principal and agent need various types of information to pursue their 
respective obligations depending on the nature of the activities done by the agent or the 
authority delegated by the principal (Glazer,1991). The current study focuses on 
information sharing regarding expected product quality, price, farming techniques, and any 
other basic information flowing between both sides. Well established information system 
has a positive impact in the performance of the agent in any field. From this discussion we 
can hypothesize that:  
H3: There is a positive association between information exchange and agent’s 
performance. 
 
Goal conflict 
Goal conflict is the degree to which individuals feel that their goals are incompatible 
(Slocum, Cron and Brown, 2002). Scholars in the principal agent theory highlight that goal 
conflict is among the causes of the agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). And according to 
Saam (2007), goal conflicts arise out of different preferences of principal and agent since 
both want to maximize their individual utility. On one hand, the agent wants to maximize 
his income, while on the other hand the principal wants to maximize his returns. Goal 
conflict is a wide concept which includes various perspectives like conflicting policy 
objectives, mismatch between rules and practices, principals and agents having competing 
interests and/or different goals (Penska and Thai, 2008; Blomberg, 2001). And this concept 
can help to explain the mismatch between policies requirement and the implementation of 
farmers’ groups and their associated activities.  
According to Lele (1998) most of the marketing associations are influenced by several 
interests apart from those of the members they are serving. Tate et al. (2010) assume that 
the agent's decisions and decisions which maximize the welfare of the principal frequently 
conflict due to the bounded rationality of the players and the complexity of contractual 
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situations between them. In this study goal conflict reflects the mismatch between rules 
and implementation processes (Schapper, et al 2006) and competing interests between 
principals (farmers’ groups) and agents (TAMA). Agency theory assumes that greater 
effort by the agent results in greater outcome (Saam, 2007) therefore conflicting goals can 
lead to organizational performance to appear ambiguous (Wright, 2004). Furthermore, 
Slocum et al. (2002) highlighted that goal conflict was negatively related to performance.  
From this discussion we can hypothesize as follows: 
H4: There is a negative association between goal conflict and agent’s performance. 
4.4 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter, the research model and the hypotheses have been discussed. Both model 
and hypotheses were developed through the review of literature on agency theory and 
collective marketing. From the research model, four hypotheses have been developed and 
will be tested in chapter seven. In the next chapter, the research methodology applied in 
the study is presented. 
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Chapter five: Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the choice of the research methodology regarding this thesis is presented. 
In detail, the research design, research method, research settings, geographical area and 
data collection method are described. In conjunction with this, the research instrument, 
items of measurements and questionnaire administration are presented in this chapter. 
Finally, the problems encountered during the data collection are also discussed. 
5.2 Research Design 
 
Yin (1994) states that research design is an action plan for getting from the initial research 
questions to the conclusions drawn to these questions. Between these two major actions, 
there may be several others steps and the main purpose of a research design is to help 
avoid the situation where the evidence does not deal with the initial research questions. 
There are various types of designs that can be applied in a study and each type is 
dependent on several factors such as the nature of the study, the research problem, the field 
of research, and the objective of the study. In the field of research design, descriptive 
research design is suitable to describe and explain conditions or fully describe a 
phenomenon as it exists; experimental research design establishes cause-effect nature of 
relationship between variables via manipulation of the cause, quasi experimental research 
design approximates the experimental design but does not have a control group (Biscoe, 
2003)  and correlational research design is suitable when the researcher wants to explore or 
test relations between variables (Vogt, 1993). 
According to Vogt, (1993), a correlational research design is used to describe the statistical 
association between two or more variables without manipulating them. Therefore, a 
correlational research design is the most suitable for this study since it aims to analyze the 
relationship between variables. 
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5.3 Geographical area and Research settings  
 
Established in 1891, the British protectorate of Nyasaland became the independent nation 
of Malawi in July 1964. The country is located in the southeastern Africa and is bordered 
by Mozambique to the south, southwest and southeast (1,569 km), Tanzania to the 
northeast (475 km) and Zambia to the northwest (837 km). With 118,484 sq km, the 
Republic of Malawi is formed by a narrow elongated plateau with rolling plains, rounded 
hills and some mountains. The land covers 94,080 sq km of  area while the water is 24,404 
sq km. Malawi counts 28 districts and Malawian climate is sub-tropical with a rainy season 
(from November to May) and a dry season the rest of the year. The population of the 
country is about 15,447,500 (2008) with 19% of urban population.  
The current study was conducted in Malawi’s agricultural sector which comprises 
smallholder farmers and big estates, specifically in the tobacco industry. Our main focus 
was smallholder farmers who grow and market tobacco collectively in groups of ten to 
thirty people, officially known as tobacco clubs, through their marketing agencies. They 
are self regulated since each group establishes its own rules (Negri and Porto, 2007). The 
current empirical study was conducted among sixteen (16) tobacco groups where 3 were 
located in Thyolo District and 13 in Mchinji District in which TAMA tobacco groups are 
more concentrated. The unit of analysis for this is the marketing association “TAMA” and 
the relevant data was provided by key informants from tobacco group members. The 
analytical model used in this study is the Principal-Agent model. In our analysis, we view 
TAMA as the « agent », acting on behalf of the principals, the group members. As this 
research is concerned with the factors that influence performance of the « agent » TAMA, 
we developed some items of agents’ performance as perceived by the principals. 
According to Rokkan and Buvik (2003), this approach of using principals instead of agents 
themselves tends to reduce the problems related to possible bias which can result from self 
reporting. It implies that by using principals to collect relevant information regarding the 
performance of the agent reduces the biasness and reveals the actual performance of the 
agent.  
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Figure 5.1 Map of the Republic of Malawi  
 
 
 
5.4 Data collection and sampling 
 
This study uses both secondary and primary data.  
5.4.1 Primary Data 
 
According to Jacobsen (2000), primary data is often collected from specific people or 
groups of people for the specific research. For this work, primary data collection was 
achieved through the assistance of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) which is collaborating with Molde University College in some of 
its research programs. The primary data were collected from key informants –tobacco 
farmer’s groups- by using a survey data collection technique with closed-ended 
questionnaire in order to collect information concerning the factors that influence 
performance of their agent. In order to elicit more information from these farmers, focus 
group discussions were conducted to give us an overview of the overall situation.  
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5.4.2 Secondary Data 
 
Secondary Data is existing data that has already been collected for some purpose by other 
people. Obtaining secondary data in practice is easy compared to primary data 
(Denscombe, 2007). For this thesis, the secondary data was collected by a desk review of 
existing journals, articles, reports and data from Malawi smallholder groups to gain a 
better understanding of the subject and to have a good foundation to build on when 
collecting the primary data. The data from Malawi were collected from four districts by 
ICRISAT in collaboration with Molde University College in 2008 and 2010.  
5.4.3 Sampling 
 
Sampling is the final stage in the research process before data is collected, and is 
concerned with identifying the objects for the primary data collection (Denscombe, 2007). 
Determination of the sample is concerned with several factors such as the type of sample, 
statistic to be applied, homogeneity of the population, time, money, and personnel 
availability for the study (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). In the current research the 
sampling frame was tobacco farmers groups that are affiliated to TAMA and this sample 
was narrowed down to the two districts mentioned above Mchinji and Thiolo. This 
sampling was done by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT), regarding the fact that this study was conducted under one of their projects. 
From each group, eight members were picked which included the leadership of the group 
and some other members.  
5.5 Items and construct measurements 
In this part, we present the items used in this study. The analysis of these items will be 
presented from chapter six.  
5.5.1 Dependent variable 
 
Agent’s performance (PERF) is the only dependent variable which is influenced by several 
other independent variables. And below are the items used to capture the level of 
performance of TAMA as perceived by the principals. 
PERF1: Our organization delivers our tobacco in time on the auction floor 
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PERF2: Our organization has good transport system and storage system for our tobacco 
PERF3: We are happy with the credits and inputs we receive from our organization. 
PERF4: The money we receive after the sale of Tobacco from our organization does not 
differ with what other similar organization are giving their members. 
PERF5: We are not satisfied with the money we receive after the sale of tobacco  
5.5.2 Independent variables 
Goal conflict (GOAL), Monitoring (MONIT), External influence (EXTI) and Information 
sharing (INFO) are the independent variables of the study.  
The four following items indicate the degree to which the respondents agree with the 
statements related to the level of goal conflict between them and their agents. 
 GOAL1: The credits and input we receive in our clubs from our organization differed with 
other clubs; 
GOAL2: Our organization meets the needs of our club; 
GOAL3: Our organization serves us according to our objectives; 
GOAL4: There are clear clubs and organizational rules; 
The level of monitoring was assessed trough the degree to which our respondents agreed to 
the following statements: 
MONIT1: We receive enough information from our organization about tobacco sales; 
MONIT2: The reports from our organization about tobacco sales are well explained; 
MONIT3: We frequently ask our organization to report to us about tobacco sales activities; 
MONIT4: We frequently control the way our organization perform tobacco sales activities; 
MONIT5: We frequently inspect our organization reports to see if they record the received 
tobacco properly; 
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MONIT6: We frequently inspect our organization to see if our tobacco arrives on time in 
the auction floor; 
MONIT7: We are frequently inspecting our organization to see if proper storage materials 
and transportation materials of tobacco are used; 
The three following items were used to assess the degree to which the respondents agree 
with the statements related to the level of external influence in collective marketing in 
Malawi. 
EXTI1: There are no other people interfering in the sales of our tobacco; 
EXTI2: The decision to sell tobacco is made by our organization; 
EXTI3: People from the government do not interfere in the sales of tobacco; 
The level of information sharing between principals and agents was assessed by the six 
following items: 
INFO1: Communication between our organization and us is very good; 
INFO2: We are kept informed by our organization about anything we want to know; 
INFO3: Our organization communicates well his expectation on tobacco quality and 
expected prices; 
INFO4: We are being informed by our organization about any changes in tobacco sales; 
INFO5: We are being informed about tobacco sales prices using sales sheet only; 
INFO6: We are being informed by our organization about what was taking place in auction 
floor. 
These items were measured by a scale using “a b c d” format which were coded after data 
collection into a “1 to 7” likert scale for better analysis. Also, the negatively worded items 
were reversed before analysis. 
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5.6 Questionnaire administration 
 
Useful and comprehensive literature review of previous studies in Agency theory and 
performance of both the agent and the principal and collective marketing literature were 
used to help us to develop our initial questionnaire-scale items. However, due to the 
language differences between our respondents and the researchers, a translator was used 
for the whole process. 
According to Churchill and Iacobucci (2002) there are several methods to administrate a 
questionnaire. It can be done either by mail administration, personal administration, fax, 
telephone and electronic surveys. But there are several factors like time, costs, or logistical 
support that must be taken into consideration (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). Knowing 
that Malawi is a developing country but also that our respondents were smallholder 
farmers, we couldn’t use the option of mail, post or telephone administration since it is 
something quite non-existent for them. These facts left personal questionnaire 
administration as the main method of administrating questionnaire in this study. 
The first day, we met three farmers’ groups affiliated to TAMA, with thirty respondents. 
The results from these first meetings enabled us to identify areas to be improved before 
going further in the field work. It appears to us that the academic language used in our 
questionnaire was quite difficult to understand for our respondents. Therefore, we decided 
to refine our questionnaire and the same night the final version was developed.  
Before giving the questionnaire to our respondents, the purpose of our study was explained 
to them at the beginning of each interview. The research questionnaire was distributed to 
104 farmers and the total number of questionnaires returned was 86, which made the 
response rate about 83 %. The main reasons for not returning questionnaire were that some 
farmers were not able to fill the questionnaire due to their lack of education.  
5.7 Problems encountered on the field 
 
During the data collection process some problems were encountered in the field. These 
problems are explained below. 
• Some of the informants were not able to fill the questionnaire due to the fact that they 
were not able to write hence their questionnaires were returned blank. 
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• Despite the close supervision of the researcher during data collection process still 
some of the questionnaires were improperly filled. This might also be caused by the 
short time used in data collection process compared to the level of understanding of 
our respondents. Some informants were filling the same question two times, such 
questionnaires were dropped during data analysis. 
• Despite the presence of the translator we still faced language challenge in the field 
since most of the farmers cannot speak English; hence it was not easy to communicate 
with them. 
5.8 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presented the methodology applied in the current study. The chosen research 
design and method have been presented as well as the types of data used in the study. The 
chapter has also presented the geographical area of the study, and the research settings. 
Furthermore, sampling and data collection process as well as questionnaire administration 
and data collection problems have been discussed. In the next chapter reliability and 
validity of measurements are presented.   
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Chapter six: Reliability and validity of measurements. 
6.1 Introduction 
 
It is an important issue for researchers to ensure that the data, the methods used and the 
results of their research are credible. The conventional bases for assessing the quality of a 
research according to Denscombe (2007) are internal and external validity, reliability, and 
objectivity. In this chapter, the validation of measurements used in this work is presented. 
 6.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
It will be an error to omit the step of descriptive statistics since it is the very first step to be 
conducted and that is recommended before processing any analysis (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). The main purpose of this step was first, to help in the checking of errors and 
other violations of assumptions underlying the statistical techniques used to address our 
research problem; but also, to describe the characteristics of our data in terms of: 
measuring the central tendency, the variability and assessing the normality of the 
distribution.  
First, descriptive statistics were used in this work to check for outliers and missing values 
and the mean and standard deviation of each variable were calculated (see appendix A, 
Table9.1). Many statistical techniques assume a normal distribution of the variables 
(Pallant, 2010, p.59) and in this study this assumption was verified through measurement 
of skewness and kurtosis which indicated a conformance to these normality assumptions. 
6.3 Reliability 
 
According to Gummesson (2000), a study is highly reliable if the results generated can be 
trusted and if the study is duplicated using the same procedures and methods will give the 
same results. There are several different aspects to reliability (Pallant, 2010, p.97) and the 
most commonly used is internal consistency. This is the extent to which all items in a scale 
are measuring the same construct. A widely used measure of internal consistency is 
Cronbach’s alpha (Pallant, 2010, p. 97; Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson, 2010). Nunnally 
(1978) recommends ideally values above 0.7 for a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.  
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In order to assess internal consistency in this study, we used Cronbach’s alpha and the 
results are quite satisfactory as presented in the table below.  
Table 6.1 Items representing different scales and their reliability estimates  
Scale Items of the scale 
 
Performance 
(4 items) 
α = 0.773 
 
PERF 2: Our organization has good transport system and storage 
system for our tobacco. 
 
PERF3:  We are happy with the credits and inputs we receive from 
our organization.  
PERF4:  The money we receive after the sale of Tobacco from our 
organization does not differ with what other similar 
organization are giving their members. 
 
PERF5: We are not satisfied with the money we receive after the 
sale of tobacco. 
 
 
Goal conflict 
(3 items) 
α = 0.801 
GOAL1: The credits and input we receive in our clubs from our     
organization is different with other clubs. 
   
GOAL2: Our organization meets the needs of our clubs. 
 
GOAL3: Our organization serves us according to our objectives. 
 
Monitoring 
(6 items) 
α = 0.817 
MONIT1: We receive enough information from our organization 
about tobacco sales. 
 
MONIT2: The reports from our organization about tobacco sales 
are well explained. 
 
MONIT3: We frequently ask our organization to report to us about 
tobacco sales activities. 
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MONIT5: We frequently inspect our organization reports to see if 
they record the received tobacco properly.    
 
MONIT6: We frequently inspect our organization to see if our 
tobacco arrives on time in the auction floor. 
       
MONIT7: We are frequently inspecting our organization to see if 
proper storage materials and transportation materials of 
tobacco are used.  
 
 
External influence 
(3 items) 
α = 0.766 
EXT1: There are no other people interfering in the sales of our 
tobacco. 
 
EXT2: The decision to sell tobacco is made by our organization. 
 
EXT3: People from the government do not interfere in the sales of 
tobacco. 
 
 
Information 
(5 items) 
α = 0.788 
INFO1: Communication between our organization and us is very 
good. 
 
INFO2: We are kept informed by our organization about anything 
we want to know. 
 
INFO3: Our organization communicates well his expectation on 
tobacco quality and expected prices 
 
INFO5: We are being informed by our organization about any 
changes in tobacco sales. 
 
INFO6: We are being informed by our organization about what 
was taking place in auction floor. 
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6.4 Validity 
 
Validity is concerned with the accuracy of the measurement methods used in the study and 
Polit, Beck, and Hungler (2001) defined validity as “the extent to which an instrument 
measures what it is intended to measure”. Three aspects of validity are important: content, 
criterion referenced, and construct validity (Polit et al; 2001). In this study we considered 
the construct validity in order to assess the validity of the measurements. According to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), construct validity is the most important aspect to be 
assessed. Construct validity refers to whether the operational definition of a variable 
actually reflects the true theoretical meaning of a concept and it is generally broken down 
into two subsets: convergent validity and discriminant validity, firstly introduced in 1959 
by Campbell and Fiske. According to Shuttleworth (2009), convergent validity is the 
extent to which scores on a measure are related to scores on other measures of the same 
construct or similar ones. On the other hand, discriminant validity refers to the degree to 
which believed unrelated constructs are, in fact, unrelated (Shuttleworth, 2009). 
But before conducting any construct validity test, it is important to check for a 
unidimensionality of the scale (Dunn, Seaker and Waller, 1994). According to Hair et al. 
(2010), a scale is unidimensional when the items are loading highly on a single factor and 
in this work, unidimensionality was assessed through factor analysis which is an approach 
used in the research process to explore relationship among a set of variables (Pallant, 2010, 
p.181).  
6.4.1 Convergent validity 
 
As mentioned above, convergent validity is the extent to which scores on a measure are 
related to scores on other measures of the same construct or similar ones. Therefore, to 
establish convergent validity, we need to show that measures that should be related are in 
fact related. The method used in this study to assess the degree of convergence is average 
variance extracted (AVE). The AVE indicates the percentage of the variance of a construct 
explained by an individual item and according a rule of thumb, AVE's values greater than 
0.5 are recognized as indicators of convergent validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Dillon, 
and Goldstein, 1984). Thus, a consequent evidence of convergent validity would be an 
AVE of .5 or above. 
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6.4.2 Discriminant validity 
 
Even if the AVE can also be used to assess discriminant validity (Fornell and Larker 
1981), this study preferred the use of a confirmatory factor analysis and especially the 
factor loading generated for each variable. According to Hair et al. (2010), high loadings 
on a factor would indicate high convergent validity; therefore if we have discriminant 
validity, the relationship between items from different constructs should be very low. 
According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1998) loadings above 0.6 are considered 
to be high and those below 0.4 are low. Therefore, the assessment of discriminant validity 
will be the correlation between similar items and their factor and a good solution will lead 
to similar items loading high on one factor and low on the others in the rotated matrix 
solution. 
The results of both convergent and discriminant validity are presented in the table below 
and were according to the literature (Fornell and Larker, 1981); (Hair, Black and 
Anderson; 2010), satisfactory. 
Table 6.2 Assessment of convergent and discriminant validity; Rotated factor loading 
solution for Monitoring (MONIT), Information (INFO), External influence (EXTI) and 
Goal Conflict (GOAL) measures 
 
Rotated Component Matrix a 
Variable  
Component 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
MONIT1 .508 .543 .156 .068 .177 
MONIT2 .529 .224 .214 .097 -.131 
MONIT3 .838 .099 -.077 -.042 .005 
MONIT5 .785 .117 -.044 -.006 .106 
MONIT6 .653 .132 .268 .027 .318 
MONIT7 
 
.655 .044 .288 .141 .058 
INFO1 .124 .754 .052 -.011 .067 
INFO2 .294 .560 .246 .084 .168 
INFO3 .373 .627 .273 -.018 .137 
INFO5 -.016 .687 .173 .280 .120 
INFO7 
 
 
.044 .703 .178 .055 .070 
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PERF2 .208 .128 .733 -.085 .364 
PERF3 .234 .337 .593 -.145 .105 
PERF5 .026 .206 .833 .156 -.012 
PERF6 
 
.089 .392 .537 .017 .214 
GOAL1 .117 -.066 .068 .828 .111 
GOAL2 .086 .170 -.026 .803 -.013 
GOAL3 
 
-.051 .134 -.026 .866 .001 
EXT1 .053 .183 .149 -.074 .854 
EXT2 .345 .062 .259 .096 .581 
EXT3 -.024 .189 .048 .128 .885 
Average Variance extracted 
(AVE) 
0,66 0,67 0,67 0,83 0,77 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaizer Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
                                         
6.5 Chapter summary 
 
The main focus of this chapter was to discuss reliability and validity of the measurements 
and methods used in this study. The method used to assess the internal consistency of the 
scale, and thus reliability, was Cronbach’s alpha. And the validity of the constructs 
measurements was analyzed in two aspects, i.e., convergent and discriminant validity. 
Convergent validity was assessed by using the Average Variance Extracted method (AVE) 
while factor loading was used to assess discriminant validity. The next chapter is 
concerned with the data analysis and the testing the previous stated hypotheses.  
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Chapter seven: Data analysis and hypotheses testing 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents analysis of data. It also includes model estimation and testing of 
hypotheses. The model estimation used in this study is multiple regression analysis which 
will be described later in this chapter. But as a starting point, a brief overview of the 
regression analysis method is presented before the regression model.  
7.2 Regression analysis  
 
Regression analysis is a statistical tool concerned with the investigation of relationships 
between a set of variables. When in the regression analysis the dependent variable is 
related to a single explanatory variable it is termed “simple regression” or bivariate 
regression while it is termed “multivariate regression” when the dependent variable is 
related to more than one explanatory variable (Sykes, 1992; Gujarati, 2003).  
This study uses multiple regression analysis since it involves the use of more than one 
independent variable. Multiple regression is a technique based on correlation that allows 
several explorations of the interrelationship among the variables (Pallant, 2010, p.148). 
According to Pallant (210, p. 149), there are three types of multiple regression analyses 
which are:  
• Standard or simultaneous multiple regression, where all the variables are entered in 
the equation simultaneously. 
• Hierarchical multiple regression, where the independent variables are moved in the 
equation in an order specified by the researcher on a theoretical basis. 
• Stepwise regression, where the researcher allows the program to select the variables 
and choose their entering order in the equation. 
Multiple regression analysis is a method that makes a lot of assumptions about sample 
size, multicollinearity, outliers, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity (Pallant, 2010, 
p.150). Later in this chapter these assumptions will be discussed. 
 55
The main estimation methods used in regression analysis are the Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and according to Gujarati (2003), the OLS 
method has some very attractive statistical properties that has made it one of the most 
powerful and popular methods of regression analysis. Therefore, this study also makes use 
of this estimation method (OLS) to estimate the coefficients of variables under study. 
7.3 Regression model 
 
The regression model applied in this study took the following form: 
Y= + +  +  + … +  + ε 
 
Where: 
Y= Dependent variable 
, , , …,  = Independent variables 
= Constant 
, , , …, = Beta coefficient of independent variables 
ε= Error term 
 
By using the OLS method, this study included all the variables in the regression model, 
thus the final model is the following:  
PERF=  + 	
+  + 
 + 
 + ε 
 
Where:  
Dependent variable 
PERF= Agent’s performance 
Independent variables 
MONIT= Monitoring activities 
EXTI= External influence 
GOAL= Goal conflict 
INFO= Information 
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7.4 Data examination 
 
Hair et al (2010) suggest that data examination is the necessary initial step for any kind of 
research. Therefore, we conducted a close examination of the data from the field work to 
check whether or not they matched with the several assumptions of multiple regression 
analysis. Thus test for outliers, normality, homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were 
assessed.  
As part of the data examination, descriptive statistics have been ran first of all in order to 
present the data in a way that they could be easily understandable. The results of these 
analyses are presented in the table 9.1 in the Appendix A.  
First, we looked for the presence of outliers. An outlier is an observation with a value that 
is very different from the values for the majority of the other observations. According to 
Pallant (2010, p.64), outlier identification is important in many applications of multivariate 
analysis since their presence can alter the result of the study and also the interpretation of 
these results. There are several methods used to detect outliers and among them, this work 
used the box plot methods in order to identify the outliers in the data set. Box plot is a 
simple type of statistical chart that is used to detect outliers in data (Pallant, 2010, p. 64). 
From this test, it appears no outlier cases. However 17 cases were dropped because they 
were incorrectly filled. We remain with 69 questionnaires which correspond to 80.2 % of 
total collected questionnaires. It is also important to note that in this study, we went from 
individual items to clustered variables by calculating the mean of all items in each 
variable. 
The normality assumption is an extremely important assumption in multivariate analysis 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p.79). It means that the residuals should be normally 
distributed about the predicted dependent variable scores. The violation of normality can 
be caused by the sample size (Hair et al, 2010) and it affects the probability of making a 
wrong decision (Pallant, 2010, p. 151). There are both graphical and statistical methods for 
evaluating normality. Graphical methods include the histogram and normality plot and 
statistical methods include skewness and kurtosis. Skewness provides an indication of the 
symmetry of the distribution while kurtosis provides information on the peakedness of the 
distribution. Several opinions have been formulated about the interpretation of the 
skewness and kurtosis values (Hair et al, 2010), (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). This study 
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uses the view of Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) to test for normality and the results are 
shown in the table 9.2in the appendix A. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 79) suggest to 
divide the skewness or kurtosis value by its own standard error value and then compare it 
with the standard normal table (Z values); the values should not exceed 3.3 (value for 
small sample). 
Multicollinearity refers to the relationship among the variables involved in the study and it 
exists when there is a high correlation (generally r= 0.90 or above) between the 
independent variables (Pallant, 2010, p. 151). Multicollinearity reduces the power of the 
model to make good predictions and may also cause individual beta coefficients to have a 
wrong sign (Grapentine, 1997). In this work, we have checked the multicollinearity 
between our variables by examining the correlation matrix but also by looking at the table 
of Tolerance and Variance inflation factor (VIF). Tolerance is an indicator of how much of 
the variability of an independent variable is not explained by the others independent 
variables in the model (Pallant, 2010, p.158) and a commonly given rule of thumb is that 
any tolerance value of 0.1 or below, raises the concern of multicollinearity.  VIF is just the 
inverse of tolerance and any VIF value of 10 or higher would indicate multicollinearity. 
The findings for both methods were consistent to the rule of thumb and are presented in 
the table 9.3 and 9.4 in the Appendix A.  
The assumption of homoscedasticity is that the variance of the residuals about predicted 
dependent variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores (Pallant, 2010, p. 
151). This assumption is also related to the normality assumption, which will be discussed 
later, since heteroscedasticity (violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity) occurs 
when the variables are not distributed in a normal manner (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, 
p.85). Thus, checking that your data are normally distributed should cut down on the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. But in multiple regression analysis, homoscedasticity can be 
assessed by looking at the scatterplot of the standardized residuals and according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell, (2007, p. 85) the residuals must be roughly rectangulary 
distributed, with most of the scores concentrated in the center. The scatter plot of residuals 
is presented in Appendix A, figure 9.1, and this figure does not show clearly the absence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
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7.5 Regression estimation 
 
After we assessed the several assumptions for regression, the constructed regression model 
was applied for statistical estimation. As presented below: 
Table 7.1 Results of multiple regression analysis 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
t B Std. Error Beta 
1        (Constant) 1.298 .939  1.382 
 GOAL -.075 .109 -.070 -.688 
   MONIT .216 .108 .208 1.997 
INFO .525 .129 .479 4.077 
          EXTI -.077 .135 -.058 -.569 
Dependent variable: PERF 
Model fit: F (4.64) = 9.457 
R2 = 0.371  
R2 Adj = 0.332 
 
From the estimation above, we extracted the following regression model: 
PERF= 1.298 - 0.075 GOAL + 0.216 MONIT + 0.525 INFO - 0.077 EXTI + ε 
The significance of the overall model was the first step to do before even starting to 
interpret the results from the above model. The ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) table 
provides us with the F-test which assesses the significance of the overall model. Regarding 
this test, the overall model was found to be good with F (4.64) = 9.457 and significant at p 
< 0.01 (results presented in the appendix A, table 9.5). The R2 Adj = 0.332 which means 
that 33.2% of the total variation in the level of agent’s performance can be explained by 
the model and the remaining percentage is explained by the variables that have not been 
included in the model. The R2 measures the percentage of variation in the dependent 
variable that can be explained by the independent variables. According to Newbold, 
Carlson and Thorne (2010, p. 464), the value of R2 ranges between 0.10 to 0.20 for models 
based on data collected from individual people. In this study the R2 was found to be 
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acceptable with a value of 0.371 which means that 37.1% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (PERF) is explained by the variation of the independent variables (GOAL), 
(MONIT), (INFO) and (EXTI).  
The table of regression results shows, first of all the association between our dependent 
variable, Agent’s performance (PERF) and the independent variables Monitoring 
(MONIT), Goal Conflict (GOAL), External Influence (EXTI) and Information (INFO); but 
also the statistical estimations of the variables in the model.  
The statistical analyses show that Monitoring (MONIT) is positively associated with the 
dependent variable agent’s performance (PERF) at the significance level of  p < 0.05; with 
b= 0.216 and t = 1.997. This means that if monitoring increases by one unit and the others 
variables stay unchanged; agent’s performance will increase by 0.216 units. The estimate 
“b” represents the computer’s attempt to find the equation that best summarizes the data 
under study and the t-value is the ratio of the estimate divided by the standard error. 
Information (INFO) is also positively associated with agent’s performance and at the 
significance level of p < 0.01, b= 0.525 and t = 4.077. As the level of information between 
TAMA and the farmers increases by one unit, while the others variables stay unchanged, 
the level of agent’s performance increases by 0.525 units.     
Then on the other hand, the level of external influence is negatively associated to the level 
of agent’s performance, b= -0.077 and t= -0.569; but this relationship is not really 
significant with p>0,1.  Which means that, as the level of external influence increases by 
one unit while the other variables remain unchanged, the level of agent’s performance will 
decrease by 0.077 but it is important to notice that this change is insignificant. 
Also, goal conflict has a negative association to the level of agent’s performance. With b= 
-0.075 and t= -0.688 but this relationship is not really significant at p>0.1. From that we 
say that the level of agent’s performance will decrease from 0.075 if the level of goal 
conflict increases by one unit while the others variables stay unchanged but again 
according to the statistical estimations, this relationship is not significant. 
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7.6 Hypotheses testing 
 
Now that we have interpreted the statistical results found, the several hypotheses 
formulated earlier in the chapter 4 will be tested based on the data analysis results. The 
four hypotheses were as follows: 
H1: There is a positive association between Monitoring and the level of 
agent’s performance. 
H2: There is a negative association between External influence and the level of agent’s 
performance. 
H3: There is a positive association between Information exchange and the level of agent’s 
performance. 
H4: There is a negative association between Goal conflict and the level of agent’s 
performance. 
The hypothesis 1 is supported by the statistical regression estimation and is significant. 
The statistics (b = 0.170, t = 1.997, p < 0.01) reveals the presence of a positive association 
between Monitoring (MONIT) and the level of agent’s performance (PERF) as proposed 
by the hypothesis before we conduct the data collection. 
In the hypothesis 2, we expected a negative association of external influence (EXTI) to 
agent’s performance (PERF) and this is what the statistical estimation shown with b= - 
0.064. However, this indication is not statistically significant as indicated by the presented 
results. 
The hypothesis 3 is supported by the statistical regression estimation and is also significant 
as for the first hypothesis. b= 0.386 and t = 4.141 signifies the presence of a significant 
positive association between Information (INFO) and agent’s performance (PERF). 
Finally, the Hypothesis 4 is also supported by the statistical regression estimation since the 
actual sign of “b” was negative as expected and shows a negative association between 
Goal conflict (GOAL) and agent’s performance (PERF). b= - 0.047 and t = -0.659. 
However, as for the second hypothesis this result was not statistically significant. 
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Table 7.2 Summary of hypotheses testing 
Hypotheses Hypothesized effect Findings 
Hypothesis 1 + +*** 
Hypothesis 2 - - 
Hypothesis 3 + +** 
Hypothesis 4 - -  
** significant at P<0.05 
*** significant at P<0.01 
 
7.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter was assigned to present and explain the model estimation as well as the 
testing of the hypotheses. The present results from regression analysis indicate that out the 
four formulated hypotheses, two are supported by the data. The next chapter will be 
devoted to further discussion of the findings but also present the limitations of the study 
and propose some area for future research. 
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Chapter eight: Discussion, summary, and limitations of the study  
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this final chapter the findings will be discussed in view of the literature on both agency 
theory and agricultural marketing. The chapter will also present the summary of the study 
and some recommendations. The limitations of this study will be also highlighted and in 
the last part of this chapter suggestions for further research will be given.  
8.2 Discussion 
 
The estimated coefficients presented in section 7.5 warrant some further discussion. In the 
extent of collective marketing literature most of the attention has been given to the 
empirical studies on factors influencing farmers’ groups’ marketing performance (Barham 
and Chitemi, 2008). Our study deviates from this main stream and contributes to 
addressing factors influencing the marketing performance of the agents working on behalf 
of the farmers group in marketing their produce. We based our hypotheses on agency 
theory literature. These hypotheses were tested for empirical authentication and no result 
was contrary to our expectations; although some were not significant. 
The coefficient estimate on the variable MONIT represent our test of the hypothesis 
regarding the influence of principal’s monitoring on the agent’s performance. The 
coefficient estimate supports the presence of a positive association between monitoring 
and agent’s performance which coincides with our first hypothesis that there is a positive 
association between monitoring and agent’s performance. This indicates that establishment 
of strong monitoring systems makes the agent act in accordance with principals interests. 
Agents sometimes can be reluctant to deliver clear reports on what they are doing to the 
principals. Due to uncertainty and informational asymmetry problems in business 
environment, principals need to establish close monitoring system which can help to make 
a follow up of agent’s performance. Regular inspections of sales report, field observation, 
and inspection of marketing activities are some of monitoring examples which can help in 
monitoring the agent behavior. 
Even though monitoring systems are costly to the principal, their positive impact on 
performance makes them to be of crucial importance to be used by the principal in any 
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principal agent relationship. In collective marketing activities done by the agent, 
establishment of effective monitoring system is of critical importance in order to make the 
group sustainable. The group should be able to observe how the agent is doing and have a 
regular review of agent’s performance report. According to Subba et al. (2008) regular 
monitoring and review systems are the key determinants of successful collective 
marketing. In general there is a relatively weak power structure from the farmers’ group 
point of view to stand firm in those monitoring systems. In such an environment 
supportive monitoring systems are urgently needed to promote the compliance behavior of 
an agent (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003).  This discussion is also supported by the available 
literature and studies who explained the usefulness of monitoring system in reducing the 
agent’s deviations (Rokkan and Buvik, 2003). 
The coefficient estimate on the variable EXTI represents our test of the hypothesis about 
the relationship between external influence and the agent’s performance. This hypothesis 
is not contradicted by our findings. However the relationship is not significant and this 
could be theoretically explained (see Olson, 1965; Truman, 1951). The potential impact of 
external influence on marketing agent’s performance in agriculture in developing countries 
has long been recognized (Roumasset, Boussard and Singh 1973; Hazell, Bassoco, and 
Arcia 1986). However, it remains empirically difficult to assess it due to heavy data 
requirements (long time series) even though some methods have been developed (Dillon 
and Scandizzo, 1978; Antle, 1987).  
Furthermore it is important to consider the motivation and ability of smallholders to 
participate in collective marketing under the conditions of high government pressure but 
also group pressure. And it is also important to consider the context of collective 
marketing in Malawi. According to Truman (1951), group pressure or government 
pressure are not new in the world, especially in Africa where there are challenges 
presented by lack of complete freedom. Moreover, field studies of collective marketing 
problems generally find that external influence vary from extremely high to extremely low 
across different settings (Ostrom, 2000). In the case of Malawi, the government has 
established and empowered all the several institutions dealing with tobacco and still has an 
invisible hand in their activities. This is a “centralized” system since all the organizations 
in Malawi in charge of tobacco are somehow linked in their decision making and farmers’ 
group management (Otañez et al, 2007). This does not create a sense of democratic 
community and does not help to protect liberties, since power relations and institutional 
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environment are often to the disadvantage of the poor (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). 
Therefore, it is not obvious that farmers use their “voice” option to point out incapable or 
corrupt actors, especially when it involves superior authorities (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 
1998). Also, the lack of prerequisites in the area, combined with an inadequate 
understanding of the study in which they were participating may have biased the responses 
to the questions. 
The coefficient estimate on the variable INFO represents our test of the hypothesis that 
mutual information has a positive effect on the agent’s performance. Here, our empirical 
finding coincides with our hypothesis. According to the theory of value, information is 
considered as a commodity that can be exchanged between two parties conducting 
transactions leading to exchange facilitation (Bell, 1973; Haeckel, 1985). Information is 
considered as self regenerative so that the identification of a new piece of knowledge 
directly creates the demand and conditions for immediate creation of subsequent pieces. 
Information is among the variables that lead to performance improvement in marketing 
activities (Glazer, 1991). The level of information possessed by the marketing agents is a 
key determinant of market power (Glazer, 1991). 
Establishment of effective and efficient communication lines in any relationship results 
into commitment and moral persuasion of respective parties (Chou et. al., 2008). In case of 
a principal agent relationship there should be a good flow of information sharing process 
in order to achieve goal congruency. This strengthens the relationship and simplifies the 
communication process between the two parties. We argue that information sharing 
regarding issues like expected prices and product quality, tobacco production and storage 
process, and obligations of each part will lead to sustainability of the relationship and trust 
between both parties which will act as a catalyst to enhance agent’s performance. In 
addition to that, market information can lead to the improvement of marketing activities. 
Therefore there should be a well established information flow system between the two 
parties. However, due to the weak position of farmers as principals, supportive information 
gathering systems should be established for them to be in a better position to acquire that 
information timely. 
Our final finding regards the hypothesized relationship between goal conflict and agent’s 
performance, represented by the coefficient estimate on the variable GOAL. This result is 
not contrary to our expectations, but it is statistically insignificant. Though it’s not 
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statically significant, it acknowledges the concept of goal conflict in the principal-agent 
literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Goal conflict results due to informational asymmetry 
problems. From our findings we can argue that the relationship between goal conflict and 
agent’s performance was insignificant due to the fact that the nature of environment in 
which collective marketing is conducted in Malawi is associated with weak relative power 
between farmers themselves and their agent. Due to this power imbalance we believe that 
it is difficult to get exhaustive information regarding this construct since principals are on 
the weak side. Furthermore, lack of clarity in explaining rules and obligations of each part 
of the relationship can be one of the reasons for this finding.  Also from a theoretical point 
of view there is a critical need to develop new theory that will explain the other forms of 
goal conflicts like competing policies and rules. 
8.3 Summary of the study 
 
The central theme trough this thesis has been to explain what factors influence agent’s 
performance in the context of collective marketing with empirical evidence from the 
Malawian tobacco industry. Agency theory was used to develop a theoretical framework 
where smallholder groups were the principal and the marketing association the agent. The 
relationship between principal and agent were used as unit of analysis in this work. 
Previous literature in the field of collective marketing has used agency theory to explain 
marketing performance of the smallholders group (Barham and Chitemi, 2009; Bernard 
and Spielman, 2009) but very few have tried to explore the collective marketing 
performance of the agent especially from the principal’s point of view. And this is what 
this work has endeavored to do. 
As outlined previously in the thesis, there are several factors that influence agent’s 
performance such as monitoring, information, goal conflict, external influence. Our thesis 
supports the argument that these factors affect agent’s performance and our theoretical 
model contains four hypotheses presented in chapter four. From these hypotheses we 
expected information and monitoring to have a positive influence on collective marketing 
performance. While we expected that goal conflict and external influence have a negative 
association with collective marketing performance.  In order to test our hypotheses, data 
collection has been conducted in the tobacco industry in Malawi. The study was conducted 
using a correlational research design in order to study the association between our 
variables. By using multiple regression analysis and factor analysis, our regression model 
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was generated and is presented in table 7.1 in chapter seven. Generally the overall model 
was statistically supported and is presented in the appendix A table 9.5. 
Our hypotheses were tested based on the regression model and all of them were supported. 
However two were insignificant. The findings revealed that the negative association 
between external influence and agent’s performance as well as the negative association of 
goal conflict and agent’s performance were not significant based on the generated model. 
The reasons for these findings have been discussed in the section above.  
8.4 Recommendations 
 
This section contains a number of recommendations based on the results and experience 
with collective marketing in Malawi during the research.    
• Incentive compensation system 
It has been noted that incentive system between Malawi tobacco groups and their agent 
TAMA is not well defined or established. There is no clear incentive flowing from 
principals to the agent as the motivation of the agent performance behavior. Since 
incentive plays a great role in inducing the agent to perform in accordance with the 
principals interest we recommend that the farmers groups should establish good reward 
incentive system for example increase the current percentage of the amount of money paid 
to the agent after the sale of the tobacco. On other side they should also focus on 
producing high quality tobacco which will motivate the agent to devote more effort of 
bargaining for better price. Also farmers groups should be faithful in repaying back any 
credit offered through their TAMA this will motivate the TAMA to link the famers groups 
to many financial institutions. In addition to that farmers groups should make sure that 
they use the right supply chain through TAMA to sell their tobacco and avoid any 
intermediaries this will fulfill the objectives of TAMA and motivate this agent to offer 
better services to the farmers groups. 
Due to weak position of farmers as principals we recommend that the government should 
play a great role in rewarding the agent so that TAMA can be motivated more to help these 
farmers groups. Also we recommend that government extension workers who support the 
growing of the tobacco should put more emphasis on high tobacco quality which will be in 
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a better bidding position on the auction floor. This will act as a motivation to TAMA to 
work hard on behalf of the farmers groups. 
• System decentralization 
As discussed previously in this study, the decisions regarding the tobacco sector in Malawi 
are highly centralized within the powerful institutions which often do not consider the 
opinion of the farmers (Otañez et al, 2007). It would be important to decentralize this 
system in order to give more power to the smallholders which feel unconsidered. 
Decentralization helps to change the existing power structures, improves participation 
since it engages the disenfranchised in the decision processes and neutralizes the power of 
local oligarchies (Bardhan, 2002; Di Gregorio et al. 2004). Di Gregorio et al. (2004) in 
their study have highlighted the fact that it is quite impossible for smallholders who have 
limited access to education and training to be a part of the administration and this calls for 
more empirical studies to help to develop new theories in order to explain on 
circumstances appropriate for a particular type of power delegated to these smallholders. 
But by giving them more power, the farmers will be able to have more incentives to 
motivate their agents and increase their performance. In addition, a decentralized system 
lead to an  increase in the competition resulting into lower prices and better services to the 
poor, especially regarding the delivery of public services (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998).  
• Institution competition 
It has been noted TAMA is the most powerful agent in Malawi tobacco industry. There is 
no intensive competition in this sector. We recommend that the government should allow 
other institutions to work on behalf of these farmers groups on the auction floor. The 
introduction of this competition will give more power to farmers groups to choose which 
agent they want to work with depending on the performance of that particular agent. To 
win these customers each agent will also strive to offer better services. Through this 
intensive competition we believe that the performance of agents will increase and improve 
the working environment of this industry. 
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8.5 Limitations of the study 
 
Much remains to be done to identify and analyze the factors influencing the agent’s 
performance. Some of the limitations of this study point the way to some interesting 
research topics. Primarily the study’s coverage was limited. Malawi’s tobacco sector 
involves several growers such as estates and smallholder groups. This study deliberately 
focused on the smallholders for consistency purpose since smallholders are the one 
concerned with collective marketing. In addition to this, Malawi is divided into 28 districts 
and each of these districts includes several farmers’ groups. Data collection for this work 
was conducted in only two districts: Thyolo and Mchinji. Therefore, the small coverage 
and numbers of observations raise a caution for generalizing the findings to cover the 
entire sector. Since tobacco crop is different from other crops due to its cash crop property, 
some of the findings may not be applied beyond the context of tobacco crops.  
Furthermore, when exploring the factors influencing agent’s performance, we have 
narrowed down our work to four dependent variables that could explain our independent 
variable. Since other areas of interest might have been left out, this work cannot fully 
explain collective marketing performance taking in account all the potential factors that 
can influence it. According to Agrawal (2001), it is not rare that empirical studies typically 
address only a subset of the factors identified in the literature, but these missing data 
inevitably limits the analysis. Therefore this missing variable constitutes also a limitation 
for our study.  
Finally, scientific literature in collective marketing in developing countries using agency 
theory was quite inexistent; and this is also responsible for some limitations in this work. 
Most of the literature used in this work to develop the research model was based on 
developed countries settings. Collective marketing in developing countries is still far from 
the one of developed countries in terms of economical ways and welfare effects of 
geographical indications (Lence, Marette, Hayes and Foster, 2007). Such differences in 
various aspects may influence the ability of the study to describe the correct scenario. That 
is, different results may be found if the study was conducted in a developed country. 
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8.6 Areas for further research 
 
This study is concerned with agent’s performance from the principal perspective in 
collective marketing context. Therefore information has been gathered only by key 
informants from one part of the relationship; the farmers. It could be interesting for further 
research to collect information from key informants from both side of the relationship 
since additional insight could be probably discovered by doing so.  
Furthermore since this work examined the factors influencing agent’s performance in 
Malawi’s tobacco industry, it can be interesting to conduct the same study using another 
industry (e.g. maize or groundnuts) or also in another African country to see whether the 
results are still valid when there is a change in the research settings.  
In this study the theoretical framework was established using agency theory and as pointed 
in the previous part of this chapter, this work was narrowed to four variables. Further 
studies should therefore not only consider looking for additional contributions to factors 
influencing collective marketing performance but strongly consider studying how agent’s 
performance affects the relationship between principals and agents. 
Finally, this work were concerned with the operational dimension of performance and 
further research on the same topic can consider to look at the financial dimension of 
performance to see whether or not it is influenced by the factors used in this study. 
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Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
GOAL 69 3.06 1.507 
MONIT 69 5.16 1.557 
INFO 69 5.14 1.478 
PERF 69 4.56 1.619 
EXTI 69 4.21 1.211 
Valid N (listwise) 69   
 
 
Table 9.2 Test of normality by z scores of skewness and kurtosis 
 
 
Skewness   Kurtosis   
Statistic Std. Error 
z scores 
for 
skewness Statistic Std. Error 
Z scores 
for 
kurtosis 
GOAL ,849 ,289 2,939 ,369 ,570 0,646 
MONIT -,698 ,289 -2,416 -,401 ,570 -0,704 
INFO -1,066 ,289 -3,692 ,422 ,570 0,740 
PERF -,551 ,289 -1,906 -,982 ,570 -1,721 
EXTI ,001 ,289 0,003 -,911 ,570 -1,597 
Valid N 
(listwise)             
 
Table 9.3 Tests for collinearity 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 
    
EXTI .961 1.040 
GOAL .955 1.047 
MONIT .754 1.327 
INFO .711 1.407 
a. Dependent Variable: PERF 
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Table 9.4 Bivariate correlation of variables 
 
Correlations 
 GOAL MONIT INFO EXTI PERF 
GOAL Pearson Correlation 1 .137 .207 -.010 .059 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .263 .087 .933 .632 
N 69 69 69 69 69 
MONIT Pearson Correlation .137 1 .491** -.024 .435** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .263  .000 .848 .000 
N 69 69 69 69 69 
INFO Pearson Correlation .207 .491** 1 -.180 .577** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .087 .000  .138 .000 
N 69 69 69 69 69 
EXTI Pearson Correlation -.010 -.024 -.180 1 -.148 
Sig. (2-tailed) .933 .848 .138  .224 
N 69 69 69 69 69 
PERF Pearson Correlation .059 .435** .577** -.148 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .632 .000 .000 .224  
N 69 69 69 69 69 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 9.5 Analysis of variance and overall model significance 
  
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 66.293 4 16.573 9.457 .000a 
Residual 112.163 64 1.753   
Total 178.457 68    
a. Predictors: (Constant), INFO, EXTT, GOAL, MONIT 
b. Dependent Variable: perfom 
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Figure 9.1 Test of heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Test of normality by histogram 
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Figure 9.3 Test of normality by normal P-P plot 
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Appendix B 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
This survey focuses on the factors that influence agent’s performance in Tobacco industry 
in Malawi. By answering this questionnaire, base your answers on your experience with 
your association.  
 
 
A. Please circle only once the letter that corresponds to your views on each of the 
following statement:  
 
1. Our organization delivers our 
tobacco in time on the auction floor 
 
2. Our organization has good transport 
system and storage system for our 
tobacco 
 
3. We are happy with the credits and 
inputs we receive from our 
organization 
 
4. The money we receive after the sale 
of Tobacco from our organization 
does not differ with what other 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
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similar organization are giving their 
members 
 
5. We are not satisfied with the money 
we receive after the sale of tobacco  
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
B. Please circle only once the letter that corresponds to your views on each of the 
following statement:  
 
1. The credits and input we receive in 
our clubs from our organization 
differed with other clubs 
 
2. Our organization meets the needs of 
our club 
 
3. Our organization serves us 
according to our objectives 
 
4. There are clear clubs and 
organizational rules 
(a)Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree (d) 
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
(a)Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree (d) 
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
(a)Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree (d) 
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
C. Please circle only once the letter that corresponds to your views on each of the 
following statement:  
 
1. We receive enough information 
from our organization about tobacco 
sales 
 
2. The reports from our organization 
about tobacco sales are well 
explained 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
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3. We frequently ask our organization 
to report to us about tobacco sales 
activities 
 
4. We frequently control the way our 
organization perform tobacco sales 
activities 
 
5. We frequently inspect our 
organization reports to see if they 
record the received tobacco properly 
 
6. We frequently inspect our 
organization to see if our tobacco 
arrives on time in the auction floor 
 
7. We are frequently inspecting our 
organization to see if proper storage 
materials and transportation 
materials of tobacco are used 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
D. Please circle only once the letter that corresponds to your views on each of the 
following statement:  
 
1. There are no other people interfering 
in the sales of our tobacco 
 
2. The decision to sell tobacco is made 
by our organization 
 
3. People from the government do not 
interfere in the sales of tobacco 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
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E. Please circle only once the letter that corresponds to your views on each of the 
following statement:  
                                                                          
 
1. Communication between our 
organization and us is very good 
 
2. We are kept informed by our 
organization about anything we want 
to know 
 
3. Our organization communicates well 
his expectation on tobacco quality 
and expected prices 
 
4. We are being informed by our 
organization about any changes in 
tobacco sales 
 
5. We are being informed about 
tobacco sales prices using sales sheet 
only 
 
6. We are being informed by our 
organization about what was taking 
place in auction floor. 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
 
(a) Agree (b) Strongly agree (c) Disagree 
(d) Strongly Disagree 
 
 
